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MNOR RIGHTS: THE ADOLESCENT
ABORTION CASES
Martin Guggenheim*

I.

INTRODUCTION

There is an old saw that "[Econstitutional rights do not mature and
come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority."' Nonetheless, there was a time before the Supreme Court ever
referred to children as having constitutional rights.2 This Article will
focus on two Supreme Court decisions issued during a very limited time
span (1976-79), in which the Court redefined the entire conception of
children's rights. What the Article will suggest is that the rule that
emerged had a lot less to do with magic than with sleight-of-hand.
Through an astonishing transformation, the Supreme Court used a
construct of children's constitutional "rights" to restrict the rights of
children. By doing so, the Court decisively derailed an incipient
children's rights movement that had the potential to liberate children
from the dominion of adults.
*©
Martin Guggenheim; Professor of Clinical Law; Director, Clinical and Advocacy
Programs, New York University School of Law. The Article was originally presented as the Sidney
and Walter Siben Distinguished Professorship Lecture at Hofstra University School of Law on
October 24, 2001. I want to thank Annette Appell and Randy Hertz who read an earlier draft of this
Article and provided me with invaluable comments and Merry Jean Chan, N.Y.U. Class of 2003 for
her excellent research assistance. I am also grateful for financial support from the Filomen
D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at New York University School of Law.
1. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,74 (1976).
2. See Laurence D. Houlgate, Three Concepts of Children's Constitutional Rights:
Reflections on the Enjoyment Theory, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 77, 77 (1999).
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The two decisions that will be the central focus of analysis here are
Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth and Bellotti v. Baird. Inthese cases,
the Court first wrote and then rewrote the rules governing a minor's right
to terminate a pregnancy. In the aggregate, the Supreme Court has
addressed the subject of a pregnant minor's rights a total of ten times
since 1973 (the first time the Court held that a woman's constitutional
right of privacy encompasses a right to terminate a pregnancy). 5 In
Danforth, the Court considered for the first time the constitutionality of
6
a state statute that contained a mandatory parental consent provision.
The Court struck down that part of the statute that prohibited unmarried
minors from procuring abortions during the first trimester of their
pregnancies without a parent's consent.7 Magisterially declaring that
"[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and

3. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
4. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
5. Since the Court decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), it has also decided the
following cases: Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding
constitutionality of statute that required one-parent notification but allowed for judicial bypass when
judge finds that notice would not serve child's best interests); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (upholding a statute
requiring one parent's consent for unwed minor's abortion because of its bypass option permitting
the minor to seek judicial consent based on a finding that the minor is mature or that abortion is in
her best interests); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 508, 519-20 (1990)
(deciding that there is no undue burden in requiring judicial bypass whereby the minor either could
show maturity, that she is a victim of abuse, or that notice is not in her best interests); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 455 (1990) (holding that a two-parent notification requirement is
constitutional as long as the minor has an option to seek judicial review); Planned Parenthood v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493 (1983) (upholding parental and judicial consent scheme which
permitted unwed minors to obtain an abortion when judge determined that the minor was mature or
that the abortion was in her best interests); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416, 440 (1983) (holding that a parental and judicial consent scheme for unwed minors which
contained a blanket determination that all minors under the age of fifteen were too immature to
make a decision and that abortion could never be in minor's best interests in the absence of parental
consent is unconstitutional), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981)
(holding that a statute requiring a physician to notify the parent "if possible" of an unemancipated,
immature minor when performing an abortion is facially constitutional); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647,
650 (plurality opinion) (holding that even when judicial bypass is available, a state law requiring
parental notification in all cases is unconstitutional); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146-47, 151
(1976) (abstaining from deciding the constitutionality of a statute restricting an unwed minor's
abortion and certifying questions to state supreme court to obtain authoritative construction of law);
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (holding that a state statute prohibiting unmarried minors from procuring
abortions during the first trimester of their pregnancies without a parent's consent is
unconstitutional).
6. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 624 (plurality opinion) (noting that inquiry into this issue began
in Danforth); Danforth,428 U.S. at 72-75 (discussing parental consent requirement).
7. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
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possess constitutional rights,"' five members of the Court concluded that
a state could not subject a minor's choice to terminate her pregnancy to a
parent's absolute veto "without a sufficient justification for the
restriction."9
Even though Danforth has never been overruled, I intend to
demonstrate that current law does not afford minors a constitutional
right to terminate a pregnancy.' Ever since Danforth, commentators
have attempted to develop a coherent theory of the constitutional rights
of children by treating the adolescent abortion cases as if they advanced
children's constitutional rights." For the most part, these commentators
have failed. But the failure did not stem from any deficit in reasoning.
Rather, the fault lay with the underlying premise: that those cases do
advance children's constitutional rights. 2 It is my contention that the
abortion cases are not really about constitutional rights of children in the
first place.
Much flows from this. If correct, this would require a substantial
reappraisal of the broader tapestry of constitutional rights of children.
The larger network of doctrine and constitutional theory lacks a
consistency which in no small part is the consequence of classifying the
abortion cases within the subject of constitutional rights. 3 Ultimately,
we will be able to identify a more coherent theory of children's rights if
we are able to categorize the abortion cases correctly.
How does one go about demonstrating that an entire line of
Supreme Court decisions is not really about the constitutional rights of
the claimants despite the Court's explicit statements to the contrary? Part
II will discuss Supreme Court decisions that establish the parameters of
constitutional rights of children through the time that Danforth was
decided. This review lays the foundation necessary to evaluate and
situate the Danforth holding within this larger framework. Part III will
8. Id. at 74.
9. Id. at 75.
10. This is not an argument about whether minors should have such a right. The argument
simply develops from the holdings of the Supreme Court on the subject of the constitutional rights
of minors.
11. See, e.g., Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 40;
Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 397 (1997); John H. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in
ConstitutionalLaw, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1763-64 (1981); Houlgate, supranote 2, at 84; Robert
B. Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents:Reflections On and Beyond the Supreme Court's
Approach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459, 503 (1982); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of
Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 571-72 (2000); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children'sRights and
the Problemof Equal Respect, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799, 809 (1999).
12. See Houlgate, supranote 2, at 84-85.
13. See Dolgin, supranote 11, at 412.
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discuss and analyze the majority and dissenting opinions in Danforth.
This Part will focus in particular on the views of the Supreme Court
Justice who played the greatest role in shaping and defining the rights of
pregnant minors: Justice Lewis A. Powell, Jr. This Part will then discuss
and analyze the 1979 decision in Bellotti v. Baird and will show that
Bellotti radically altered the meaning and significance of Danforth and
effectively eviscerated whatever constitutional rights of privacy the
earlier decision may have created. Part IV will discuss the implications
of the minor abortion cases. First, it will demonstrate who really were
the winners and losers in these cases. Next, this Part will take a careful
look at the "rights" that pregnant minors actually possess under the
holding in Bellotti. Finally, this Part will examine whether, and to what
extent, the pregnant minor cases establish a precedent for children's
constitutional rights in other areas of the law. Part V will offer an
explanation for the minor abortion cases, suggesting that they are best
understood as a conservative Court's efforts to create rules that allow
pregnant minors to obtain abortions while ensuring that those rules will
not be used to advance children's claims for greater constitutional rights
in other areas of the law.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN GENERALLY: THE
YEARS LEADING UP TO PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. DANFORTH

Supreme Court decisions on the constitutional rights of children
come in a variety of forms. For sake of ease, through the mid-1970s
when the adolescent abortion cases were first decided, we may divide
the constitutional cases concerning children into three categories. The
first involves conflicts between parents and the state. The second
involves conflicts between children and the state. The third set, of which
the abortion cases are paradigmatic, involves a clash between parents
and children.
A.

Clashes Between Parentsand the State

Whether and to what extent these cases may even qualify as
"children's rights" cases is beyond the focus of this Article. Whatever
characterization these cases ultimately yield, however, it is impossible to
discuss children's rights in the United States without considering these
cases. This is because one cannot discuss constitutional rights of
children without recognizing that children must be discussed in
relational terms. Children go with adult caregivers (which, for these
purposes, we will call "parents") almost by definition. Certainly, infants
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are inherently dependent.' 4 Indeed, this is the starting point of all
analyses of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit:
[T]o be a child is to be at risk, dependent, and without capacity or
authority to decide free of parental control what is "best" for oneself.
To be an adult is in law to be perceived as free to take risks, with the
independent capacity and authority to decide what is "best" for oneself
without regard to parental wishes. To be an adult who is a parent is
therefore to be presumed by law to have the capacity, authority, and
responsibility to determine and to do5 what is "good" for one's children,
what is "best" for the entire family.
At their deepest level, the cases in this category raise the most basic
questions about the relationship of citizen and state because they
necessarily involve some inquiry into "whose" child is being fought over
when parents and the state clash. They unavoidably include an inquiry
into whether children are in the first instance viewed as citizens entitled
to protection by the state or as part of their parents' family to be raised
by them beyond the reaches of the state.' 6 Cases in this category have
14. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN Er AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 7 (1979); see
also Martha Minow, Rightsfor the Next Generation:A FeministApproach to Children'sRights, 9
HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 1, 18 (1986).
15. GOLDSTEIN Er AL., supranote 14, at 7.
16. A wide range of explanations have been offered for the primacy of parental control in
child rearing. These include the claim that basic to an adult's autonomy and freedom to procreate is
the right to raise children as parents see fit. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of
Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1348, 1371-73 (1994); David A.J.
Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6-20, 28 (1980) (noting that child rearing "is one of the ways in which many
people fulfill and express their deepest values about how life is to be lived. To this extent, one's
children are the test of one's life and aspirations."); see also PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED
STORIES: THE CONSTrrtITrON AND FAMILY VALUES 168, 226-49 (1997) (parental rights are "an
aspect of human self-definition and moral choice" and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause was explicitly intended to protect Americans' right to have, keep, and raise children free
from state involvement as a direct reaction to these basic liberties of which slaves were deprived).
Others see parental rights in political terms through which the family serves a public function of
producing citizens with diverse values shaped by what their parents want rather than a more narrow,
homogeneous vision of the state's. See, e.g., William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral
Pluralism,Political Pluralism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 869,
901 (1999). Still others regard parental rights as akin to a trust given to them by the state with
residual powers vested in the state to intervene when parents breach their duties to children. See,
e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries,81 VA. L. REv. 2401, 2401
(1995). They also include the claim that a parent's right to raise children stems from outdated
property rights which men once enjoyed under American law over wives and children. See Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Who Ovns the Child? Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property,33 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 995, 1042 (1992). For a particularly thoughtful summary of these various views, and
others, see Annette Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood,34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 27-37, on file with Author).
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involved fights over who decides the shape of a child's education,'7
religion,' 8 custody (including foster care and termination of parental
rights),' 9 and a myriad of other child rearing choices.
The constitutional parental right to control the details of a child's
upbringing has been recognized by the Supreme Court throughout the
twentieth century as part of the substantive due process rights of
Americans.2 ' It is a fundamental tenet of American constitutional law
that parents enjoy the right to control the details of their children's
upbringing,22 and that families enjoy a right to familial privacy ' and
liberty.24 In the words of the Supreme Court, "[t]he history and culture of
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the
nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as
an enduring American tradition." 5
Although the Constitution does not expressly confer upon parents
the right to rear their children without undue interference by the state,
rights of this nature have been found implicit in a number of
constitutional guarantees. The Court has located the freedom of parents
and families against unnecessary state intrusion as within the
28
27
26
Constitution's protections of privacy, liberty, and personal integrity.

17. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205, 234 (holding that a compulsory-attendance law is
unconstitutional when applied to Amish families); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925) (holding that parents cannot be required to send their child to public school); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (holding that a statute prohibiting the teaching of a foreign
language to children who had yet to reach the eighth grade is unconstitutional).
18. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208-09; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)
(sustaining application of child labor laws to a child exercising her religious convictions).
19. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977)
(upholding a procedure of removing foster children from their foster homes); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that parents are entitled to a hearing before their children are
removed from their custody and that parents have substantive due process rights to the care and
custody of their children).
20. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977) (plurality opinion);
see also Susan Gluck Mezey, ConstitutionalAdjudication of Children'sRights Claims in the United
States Supreme Court, 1953-92, 27 FAM. L.Q. 307, 323-25 (1993) (listing forty-seven cases on
children's rights).
21. See, e.g., Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
22. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230-34; Pierce,268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
23. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965).
24. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The absence of dispute [concerning
the fundamental nature of the parent-child bond] reflect[s] this Court's historical recognition that
freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
25. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
26. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
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In Meyer v. Nebraska,29 the first significant parents' rights case, the
Supreme Court held that the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments encompassed the right
to marry, establish a home, and bring up children; a statute forbidding
the teaching of the German language was invalidated as an
impermissible infringement on the freedom of parents to have their
children learn a foreign tongue if they wished. In dictum, the Court
considered the practice, endorsed by Plato and others, of removing
children from their homes for training by "official guardians" and
concluded:
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of
great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and
State were wholly different from those upon which our institutions
rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could impose
such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence to
both letter and spirit of the Constitution.3
Relying on Meyer, the Court two years later struck down an Oregon
statute requiring children to attend public schools in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters. The Justices found that this statute unduly interfered with the
right of parents to select private or parochial schools for their children
and that it lacked a "reasonable relation to [any] purpose within the
competency of the State."33 The Court wrote:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children .... The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.3
In Prince v. Massachusetts," the Court asserted in dictum that "[i]t
is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
27. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639-40 (1974); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230-34; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce,268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
28. See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651; Grisivold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
30. See id. at 403.
31. Id. at 402.
32. 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925).
33. Id. at 535.
34. Id.
35. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. 3 6 In
1972, the Court declared unconstitutional an Illinois dependency and
neglect statute that deprived unmarried fathers of the care and custody of
their natural children on the death of the mother without any showing of
the father's unfitness.37 The Court held that when the state seeks to
disrupt the parent-child relationship, its justifications for doing so must
satisfy an exacting standard of scrutiny because "[lt is plain that the
interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which
derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.""'3
B. Clashes Between Children and the State
The second set of cases involves clashes between children and the
state. These cases are less venerable; many of them were decided in the
1960s. They involve the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, particularly in juvenile delinquency proceedings39 and in
the First Amendment,4' along
the public schools. ° They also concern
42
with the occasional Equal Protection case.

36. Id. at 166. Prince nevertheless held that the state could limit this freedom to the extent
necessary to protect children from serious hazards to their physical well-being. See id. The Court
sustained the conviction of a minor's guardian for violating a child labor law by permitting the child
to sell evangelical newspapers pursuant to the missionary tenets of the child's and guardian's
religion. See id. at 170. "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free ...to make martyrs of their children ....Id. at 170.
37. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
38. Id. at 651 (second alteration in original) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
"The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to
conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of
man,' and '[r]ights far more precious.., than property rights.' 'It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder.' The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment."
Id. at 651 (alteration and omission in original) (citations omitted).
39. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 520 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
533 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 358-59 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
40. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 567
(1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
41. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631, 635 (1968).
42. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 765-66 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972);
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Perhaps the most well-known children's rights case, and the one
widely regarded as igniting the subject, is In re Gault,43 decided in 1967.
In Gault, the Court was given its first opportunity to determine what, if
any, procedural constraints the Constitution placed on state officials in
juvenile delinquency proceedings.: The Court refused to take for
granted that juvenile delinquency trials should precisely mirror their
adult criminal counterparts. 5 Instead, the majority wished to find a
jurisprudential basis for affording the essential protections of the adult
criminal process while preserving the rehabilitative goals,
confidentiality, and other benevolent features of the juvenile court
process.4' To effect these results, the Gault majority decreed that
juveniles would enjoy those constitutional rights-but only those
rights-necessary to implement the Due Process Clause's guarantee of
"fundamental faimess.' 47 The Court addressed four specific rights at
issue in the case before it: the privilege against self-incrimination and
the rights to counsel, fair notice of the charges, and to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses.4 The Court concluded that these rights
are so fundamental to a system of justice, that they are required in
juvenile delinquency prosecutions.4 9 The Court left for another day, and
other cases, the task of further fleshing out its vision of the core elements
of a fundamentally fair justice process."°
Three years later, in In re Winship,5' the Court revisited the subject,
addressing the question whether a juvenile may be convicted of a
delinquency offense based only on a preponderance of the evidence
rather than the usual adult criminal standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.52 The Court ruled that in juvenile delinquency cases, as

Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 74 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68,
70 (1968).
43. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Many years earlier, the Court held that when persons under eighteen
are prosecuted in the adult criminal justice system, they retain basic constitutional rights in those
proceedings. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596, 601 (1948).
44. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.
45. See id. at 30.
46. See id. at 21.
47. See id. at 30-31, 31 n.48.
48. See id. at 29.
49. See id. at 33-34 (notice); ialat 36, 41 (counsel); id. at 49-50, 55 (self-incrimination); id. at
56-57 (confrontation and cross-examination).
50. See id. at 13, 31 n.48.
51. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
52. See id. at 359.
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in criminal cases, the Due Process Clause requires a standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 3
The calculus of fundamental fairness produced a very different
result, however, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania- in the very next Term. In
arguing for a constitutional right to a jury trial, the juvenile appellants
emphasized that the fact-finding stage of a juvenile delinquency case, as
reshaped by Gault and Winship, mirrored the adult criminal trial in
virtually all respects except the right to a jury.5 The Court ruled that the
Constitution is not offended when juvenile delinquency cases are tried
without juries (despite the Sixth Amendment). 6 Finally, in 1975, the
Court held that juveniles are protected against double jeopardy when
prosecuted as delinquents.5 7
Outside of the criminal justice arena, the Supreme Court has
insisted upon imposing constitutional restraints on government even
when children are directly involved in the government action. So, for
example, in West Virginia School Board of Education v. Barnette," the
Court held that the First Amendment prohibits state officials from
forcing citizens to speak, even when those officials are school teachers
and the citizens are children required to pledge allegiance to the flag. 9
And, in Brown v. Board of Education,60 the Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from
6
operating formally segregated schools. '
Between the time of Gault and the Court's decision in Danforth,
the Court decided a number of other important cases bearing on the
constitutional rights of children outside of the juvenile delinquency
context. In Ginsbergv. New York,62 the Court held that it is constitutional
for states to restrict access of nonobscene sexually explicit materials to
53. See id. at 368.
54. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
55. See id. at 541. Other than the jury trial right, the primary differences between juvenile
delinquency and adult criminal procedure, concern the pretrial and post-trial stages of a case:
juveniles generally lack the right to bail pending trial and are subject to shorter sentences upon
conviction than adult criminal defendants. See generally RANDY HERTZ ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE COURT § 4.15, at 86-88 (1991) (noting that the use of bail in
juvenile court has been rejected in the majority of jurisdictions while bail is allowed in adult
proceedings); id. § 38.03, at 870-74 (discussing the dispositional alternatives and the judge's
discretion in a juvenile proceeding).
56. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
57. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
58. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
59. See id. at 642.
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. See id. at 495.
62. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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persons under seventeen. 63 There were two principal rationales for this
decision. First, and most importantly, the Court ruled that children are
materially different from adults for certain First Amendment purposes,
because they are not yet fully formed, mature people. Justice Stewart's
famous concurrence in the case best captures this sentiment: "[A] State
may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated
areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of
that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of
First Amendment guarantees." 4 The second justification was that the
restriction was a form of providing support for parents to assist them in
deciding whether and when to permit their children access to these
materials. 65 The Court was quick to point out that the challenged statutes
did not prevent parents from giving these materials to their children; it
merely barred the children from purchasing them directly.6
The Court also decided three cases involving children and public
schools between the Gault decision in 1967 and Danforth in 1976. In
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,6 the
Court held that children in public school retain First Amendment rights
to engage in nondisruptive political speech.6 In Goss v. Lopez,69 the
Court held that school officials must comply with the rudiments of
70
procedural due process before suspending a student from public school.
Finally, in Ingrahamv. Wright,71 the Court held that corporal punishment
of public school children, over the objection of the children and their
parents, did not violate the Constitution. 72 In Part III, we will return to
these three decisions and explore them in somewhat greater depth when
we review the particular views of Justice Powell.73
C. Clashes Between Childrenand Parents
As remarkable as it may seem, prior to the abortion cases
themselves, the Supreme Court never decided a case involving a known
conflict between a parent and child. In all of the cases already discussed
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id. at 643.
Id. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
See id. at 639.
See id.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
See id. at514.
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
See id. at 582.
430 U.S. 651 (1977).
See id. at 683.
See infra Part 1lI.B.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:589

involving clashes between parents and the state, the views of the
children were either irrelevant to the decision or, although potentially
relevant, presumed to be in accord with the parents'. 74 The one
opportunity the Court had to address a potential conflict between the
parent's and child's preferences was Wisconsin v. Yoder.75 In that case,
the Court held. that an Amish parent could not be convicted for refusing
to send his 15-year-old daughter to school when he chose to keep her at
home to work on the farm and cement the values of the Amish
community.76 Justice Douglas's well-known dissent7 objected to ceding
this awesome power to the parent to withdraw his child from school,
with the concomitant impact such a withdrawal would have on the life's
prospects for the child, without ascertaining the child's wishes on the
subject.7s For Justice Douglas, if the child wished not to be in school, he
would have concurred in the judgment declaring the compulsory
education requirement unconstitutional as applied to her.79 But, if the
child would rather be in school, Justice Douglas would not have
permitted the father to withdraw her from school. 0 No other Justice
joined his opinion. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger held that
because the record was silent on the child's views, the Court would
presume that the child is aligned with her father.' He went on to add that
if there were an actual conflict between father and child recognizing a
child's claim to attend school over the parent's objection, this "would
give rise to grave questions of religious freedom comparable
' to those
raised here and those presented in Piercev. Society of Sisters.,,2
This completes this brief discussion of the pertinent constitutional
cases concerning children prior to Danforth. Although this discussion
has not included all cases, nor discussed any of them in great depth, it
provides sufficient background to move on to the abortion cases
themselves.
74. See, e.g., Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 663 (mentioning that some states require approval or
notification of a child's parents before infliction of punishment but no state requires approval by the
child).
75. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
76. See id. at 218, 234.
77. Id. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the child's right to decide her
own education ought to prevail over a contrary parental view).
78. See id. at 244-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
79. See id. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
80. See id. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
81. See id. at 231. "The State has at no point tried this case on the theory that respondents
were preventing their children from attending school against their expressed desires, and indeed the
record is to the contrary." Id. (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 231-32 (citation omitted).
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III. THE EVOLUTION FROM PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. DANFORTH TO
BELLOTTI V. BAIRD

A.

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth

The holding in PlannedParenthoodv. Danforth? is simple enough:
The Court declared unconstitutional that part of a Missouri statute that
prohibited unmarried minors from obtaining abortions during the first
trimester of their pregnancies without a parent's consent."' Five members
of the Court determined that a state could not subject a minor's choice to
terminate her pregnancy to a parent's absolute veto "without a sufficient
justification for the restriction."" The opinion for the Court was written
by Justice Blackmun. 8 However, only Justices Brennan and Marshall
fully joined his opinion." Justices Stewart and Powell concurred
separately in an opinion written by Justice Stewart." There were four
dissenting votes-Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist,
and Stevens.89
One of the most striking aspects of the Court's decision is that its
holding was reached with virtually no constitutional analysis. 9° This may
be because of the structure of the case itself. Danforth reviewed
Missouri's complicated abortion statute, which contained a myriad of
restrictions on a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy, including a
requirement for a married adult to obtain consent of her spouse and a
requirement for an unmarried minor to obtain the consent of her parent.'
It may be that Justice Blackmun devoted so much of the decision to
explaining why the spousal consent provision was unconstitutional' that
he failed to appreciate the deep constitutional issues implicit in striking
down a parental consent requirement. Or it may be that he chose not to
say very much on the subject because of the inherent difficulty of
reconciling minors' constitutional rights with the vast body of law
granting parents the authority to make child rearing decisions. But
whatever the reason, Justice Blackmun quickly-one might say,
83. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
84. See id. at 74, 75.
85. Id. at 75.
86. See id. at55.
87. See id. at 54.
88. See id. at 89 (Stewart, J., concurring).
89. See id. at 92 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); iL at 101 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. See id. at 55-84.
91. Seeid. at58-59.
92. See id. at 69-72.
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facilely-reached the conclusion that "the State may not impose a
blanket provision ... requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco
parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the
first 12 weeks of her pregnancy." 93 The Court's entire analysis is reduced
to a single sentence: "Just as with the requirement of consent from the
spouse, so here, the State does not have the constitutional authority to
give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the
decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's
",94
pregnancy ....
This is nothing short of astonishing. The Court declared Missouri's
law requiring parental consent before a minor could obtain a
nonemergency abortion unconstitutional because it constituted a
"delegation" from the state to parents which the state does not possess in
the first place. 9 But it should be immediately apparent that the
delegation theory is unsound. To begin with, by emphasizing that the
Missouri Legislature delegated a power it did not possess in the first
place, the Court ignored the codifying function of the statute at issue. At
common law and throughout American history, parents have always had
the authority to decide all important decisions for their children,
including medical decisions, even without any benefit of a statute.'
Certainly, this was the case in Missouri.97
On the other hand, modem theorists like to remind us that the entire
relationship of citizen and state is created by the state since nothing
about our laws exists beyond the reach of our legal system to change.98
Under this reasoning, proof that parental rights were part of the common
93. Id. at 74. "The fault with [the statute] is that it imposes a special-consent provision,
exercisable by a person other than the woman and her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor's
termination of her pregnancy ....
Id. at 75.
94. Id. at 74.
95. See id. I use the word "delegate" here as a substitute for the Court's phrase "the State does
not have the constitutional authority to give." Id.
96. See infra note 97.
97. See, e.g., Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (holding that
general parental authority to deny medical treatment of minor child may only be overridden to
protect child from grave harm); see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.061(1) (West 1992) (authorizing an
unmarried minor's parents to consent to surgical or medical treatment for the minor); id. § 431.063
(noting that the usual requirement of consent to perform surgical or medical treatment for minor is
implied where an emergency exists with "emergency" defined "as a situation wherein ... delay
occasioned by an attempt to obtain a consent would reasonably jeopardize the life, health or limb of
the person affected"). Both of these statutes were enacted in 1971 before the decision in Roe r.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 431.061,431.063.
98. See David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 556-67
(2000); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
835, 837 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can
Learnfrom Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (1989).
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law does not by itself negate the delegation claim. But now the
delegation claim is focused on common law principles and asserts that
the state may not, by any means, authorize parents to exercise control
over their pregnant daughter's ability to obtain an abortion. To the extent
we can agree that even common law rules constitute a form of delegation
of power by the state, it cannot be forgotten that, until Danforth, courts
understood that parental rights theory, even when protected without
benefit of any statute, was based on the Constitution itself.99 A rule based
on the Constitution cannot so easily violate the Constitution. To the
extent a parent's right to authorize medical treatment for his or her minor
child is a manifestation of a power which the Constitution reserves to the
people,' °° the delegation claim makes no sense. Regrettably, however,
the Danforth Court failed to offer anything more than its bottom-line
conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional.'0 ' The decision does not
explain why parents may not have this authority.
As the earlier discussion has already shown, a parent's right to raise
children and to live within a family unit free from government oversight
and intervention has formed the nucleus of bedrock constitutional
doctrine in the United States for most of the twentieth century're
Although the formal justifications for vesting parents with this power
have changed from the Lochner era when the principles were first
established, the constitutional rights of parents survived that era and
have been endorsed by the Supreme Court ever since as within the
liberty rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 3 Professor Woodhouse has suggested that the original
99. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,535 (1925).
100. Cf. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 60 (noting that the substantive right to terminate a pregnancy
may be said to "be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people").
101. Seeid. at74-75.
102. See supranotes 21-38 and accompanying text.
103. Justice Kennedy recently had the opportunity to observe that had Meyer and Pierce been
decided in recent times, they "may well have been grounded upon First Amendment principles
protecting freedom of speech, belief, and religion." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 95 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Their formulation and subsequent interpretation have been quite different,
of course; and they long have been interpreted to have found in the Fourteenth Amendment
concepts of liberty, an independent right of the parent in the "'custody, care and nurture of the
child,' free from state intervention." Id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,543-44 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
I do not think it was wrong to put those decisions [Meyer and Pierce] on "the right of the
individual to ... establish a home and bring up children," or on the basis that "[t]he
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes
any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only."... [E]ven though today those decisions would

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:589

bases for the support of parental rights that have become enshrined in the
Constitution are no longer palatable to modem defenders of family
rights. ' Instead, they are today defended as supporting "intellectual
liberty and family integrity, when placed in the context of their times,
they are revealed as closely linked" to "an integral part of the resistance
by conservatives to a large range of programs such as mandatory free
public schooling, restriction of child labor, and maternal and infant
health programs supported by progressives and populists."'05
Summarizing its cases, the Court in 1982 said that "It]he absence of
dispute [concerning the fundamental nature of the parent-child bond]
reflect[s] this Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment."" °
Even more recently, in 2000, Justice Kennedy wrote: "As our case
law has developed, the custodial parent has a constitutional right to
determine, without undue interference by the State, how best to raise,
nurture, and educate the child. The parental right stems from the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'' 7
Justice Blackmun got it exactly backwards even to regard parental
rights as something the state gave to parents. Under any reasoning, these
are not rights "delegated" to parents by the state. Instead, they are rights
which parents possess as bulwarks against the exercise of state power.
The most problematic facet of Justice Blackmun's logic, however,
remains to be discussed. What ultimately proves the delegation claim to
be false is the reason parents have rights to raise children. The Court
declared the statute illegal because the state may not give parents power

probably have gone by reference to the concepts of freedom of expression and
conscience assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, concepts that are
derived from the explicit guarantees of the First Amendment against federal
encroachment upon freedom of speech and belief. For it is the purposes of those
guarantees and not their text, the reasons for their statement by the Framers and not the
statement itself, which have led to their present status in the compendious notion of
"liberty" embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (first omission in original) (citations omitted).
104. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children's Rights:
IncorporatingEmergingHuman Rights into ConstitutionalDoctrine, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 29-30
(1999).
105. Id. at 27, 28-29.
106. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977).
107. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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that the state itself does not have in the first place.' 3 But this is precisely
what parental freedom is all about: the exercise of child rearing authority
that the state does not have. That parents are free to train their children
in a particular religion is the other side of the coin of American
constitutional principles that the state may not prefer one religion over
another."° Can it plausibly be claimed that the state "delegated" the
power to parents to teach children religion? It is difficult to appreciate
what is gained by describing the law in this way. The child rearing right
reserved to parents is quintessentially one not given to them by the state.
But, even assuming the validity of framing the claim in this manner,
would this delegation be illegal on the theory that the state may not teach
children religion? To ask the question is to answer it. Under the most
fundamental of American constitutional principles, parents may do that
which the state may not. "0° This is the ineluctable implication of the wellknown precept that the "custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primaryfunction andfreedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.'.
The votes of Justices Stewart and Powell were necessary to achieve
the majority in Danforth."2 They concurred separately in an opinion
written by Justice Stewart."' Justice Stewart's concurrence emphasized
that the "primary constitutional deficiency" of the parental consent
requirement is "its imposition of an absolute limitation on the minor's
right to obtain an abortion."' 1 4 Quite different from Justice Blackmun's
majority opinion, Justice Stewart emphasized that minors "may be illequipped" to decide for themselves whether to terminate a pregnancy
and that he has "little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally
permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the
help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision
108. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (stating that because
the state does not have the authority to regulate abortion during the first stage, it cannot delegate
that authority to anyone else).
109. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,215-26 (1963).
110. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
111. Id. (emphasis added); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66 (plurality opinion); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 865 n.31 (1997); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (Stevens,
J.); id. at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 257-58 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
638 (1979) (plurality opinion); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 621 n.1 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 758 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); Quilloin,
434 U.S. at 255; Smith v. Org. of FosterFamilies,431 U.S. at 843; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 639 (1968).
112. See Danforth,428 U.S. at 54.
113. See id. at 89 (Stewart, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 90 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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As a consequence, Justice Stewart

[A] materially different constitutional issue would be presented under a
provision requiring parental consent or consultation in most cases but
providing for prompt (i) judicial resolution of any disagreement
between the parent and the minor, or (ii) judicial determination that the
minor is mature enough to give an informed consent without parental
concurrence or that abortion in any event is in the minor's best interest.
Such a provision would not impose parental approval as an absolute
condition upon the minor's right but would assure in most instances
consultation between the parent and child.16
Justice White vigorously dissented in an opinion which was joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist."7 In his view, the
Missouri statute was constitutional because:
Missouri is entitled to protect the minor unmarried woman from
making the decision in a way which is not in her own best interests,
and it seeks to achieve this goal by requiring parental consultation and
consent. This is the traditional way by which States have sought to
protect children from their own immature and improvident decisions;
and there is absolutely no reason expressed
by the majority why the
18
State may not utilize that method here.'
Finally, Justice Stevens separately dissented from striking the
parental consent requirement." 9 In Justice Stevens's view, Missouri was
properly protecting the welfare of minors by requiring parental
consent.' 20 As he saw it:
A state legislature may conclude that most parents will be primarily
interested in the welfare of their children, and further, that the
imposition of a parental-consent requirement is an appropriate method
of giving the parents an opportunity to foster that welfare by helping a
pregnant 2 1distressed child to make and to implement a correct
decision.'

115. Id. at 91 (Stewart, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 90-91 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Justice Powell relied upon these
principles three years later when he wrote the Bellotti plurality opinion. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at
639-51 (plurality opinion).
117. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 92 (White, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 95 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
119. See id. at 101 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. See id. at 105 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id. at 104 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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He went on to criticize Justice Blackmun's unarticulated
assumption "that the capacity to conceive a child and the judgment of
the physician are the only constitutionally permissible yardsticks for
determining whether a young woman can independently make the
abortion decision."'
None of this means, nor is it my purpose to demonstrate, that the
Court was wrong to hold that the Constitution is violated when parents
have the power to prevent their pregnant minors from terminating an
unwanted pregnancy. Indeed, I do not wish to make a normative
argument on the subject at all. It would be one thing if Danforth proved
to accomplish more than divest parents of their authority to make
important decisions for their pregnant children. But, as we shall see, it
turns out that Danforth did not free pregnant minors from an adult's
guardianship and liberate them to the category of individuals responsible
to decide for themselves whether to terminate their pregnancy."z With
this in mind, all I hope to have demonstrated thus far is that the Court's
reasoning in Danforth is deeply flawed and unsatisfactory. Instead, the
holding and the reasoning were, in effect, merged.
Whether or not Danforth's reasoning is sound, the holding
unquestionably appeared at the time to signal a new era of constitutional
rights for young people. Certainly the significance of according to
minors a constitutional right of privacy that trumps parental authority
was potentially monumental. But, it turns out, Danforth does not begin
to tell the full story of pregnant minor rights. In this fuller story, it
eventually becomes clear that the majority view in Danforth came to be
replaced by a very different view on children's rights. This fuller story is
really the story of the principal architect of the Supreme Court decision
that proved to be the demise of Danforth: Justice Powell's 1979 plurality
decision in Bellotti v. Baird.'24 To tell this story, it is useful to review
Justice Powell's known views on children's rights as expressed through
his authored decisions as a Justice up to the time he wrote his Bellotti
opinion.
B. Justice Powell's Views on Children'sRights Generally
Justice Powell joined the Court in 1972.'2 A small but significant
number of cases concerning children were decided by the Court between
122. Id. at 105 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. See itifra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
124. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
125. See JOHN N. JACOB, THE LEvIS F. POWELL, JR. PAPERS: A GUIDE 8 (1997).
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1972 and 1979.126 Fortunately, for our purposes, Justice Powell was
given the opportunity to write the Court's opinion in several of these
126. The category of cases "concerning children" is necessarily vague. For present purposes, it
is not essential that this grouping be exact, only that it includes all of Justice Powell's opinions that
speak directly to the relationship of children, parents and the state. There are three categories of
cases that this phrase captures. The first category consists of challenges to various schemes that treat
differently children born out-of-wedlock and children born of marriages, including the so-called
"rights of unwed fathers." See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by the sex-based distinction
between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers in New York law that authorized unwed mothers,
but not unwed fathers, to block the adoption of their child); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76
(1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that the New York statute that imposed a requirement that a
filiation order be obtained during the father's lifetime in order for out-of-wedlock children to inherit
from their fathers did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799-800
(1977) (determining that the Immigration and Nationality Act which has the effect of excluding the
relationship between an illegitimate child and his natural father, as opposed to his natural mother,
from the special preference immigration status accorded a "child" or "parent" of a United States
citizen or lawful permanent resident is constitutional); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 775-76
(1977) (stating that the provision of the Illinois statute that allowed children born out-of-wedlock to
inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers denied the children equal protection); Weber
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173-76 (1972) (finding that the state's workmen's
compensation statute's denial of equal recovery rights to dependent unacknowledged illegitimates
violates the Equal Protection Clause).
The second category consists of cases concerning schools, including "student rights,"
"teacher's rights," "parent's rights" and "others" containing Religion Clause challenges to funding
schemes involving nonpublic schools and racial discrimination. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979) (holding that a New York statute requiring citizenship for public school
teachers bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest and is, therefore, constitutional);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (holding that the use of public funds for purchases in
private schools of instructional materials and equipment for the students and for transportation for
field trips was unconstitutional); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682-83 (1977) (stating that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to disciplinary
corporal punishment in public schools and the "Due Process Clause does not require notice and a
hearing prior to the imposition of corporal punishment in the public schools"); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
notice and some kind of a hearing before suspending public school students); Comm. for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,798 (1973) (determining that New York's various aid
formulae to private schools had the primary effect of advancing religion and therefore offended the
Establishment Clause); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 246-47 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the "law has long recognized the parental duty
to nurture, support, and provide for the welfare of the children, including their education"); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (finding that Texas's unequal school
financing scheme was not unconstitutional even if it resulted in poor school districts receiving a
poorer quality education because "where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not
require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages").
The third and final category of cases is a small, but important, "miscellaneous" category.
See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1977) (holding that the New York
statute making it illegal to give contraceptives to minors is unconstitutional); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977) (plurality opinion) (stating that the zoning ordinance
prohibiting grandmother from raising two nephews from different parents is unconstitutional as
unlawful infringement on families' liberty); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75
(1976) (finding that the statute requiring the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis
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cases and saw fit to write separate concurrences or dissents in others.'27
Through a careful reading of these opinions, we are able to know a fair
amount about his views on the relationship of children to parents and the
state by the time he wrote the plurality opinion in Bellotti. For present
purposes, however, it will suffice to look at those opinions in which
Justice Powell wrote directly on his views of children's rights and the
place of children in the constitutional framework of rights.
One lesson that becomes clear is that Justice Powell insisted on
strict enforcement of the constitutional norm of equal protection of the
laws prohibiting states from treating children differently from other
children unless the differential treatment survived exacting scrutiny by
federal courts.'2 This is an important guidepost for many of his opinions
from 1972 to 1979 concerning children. For Justice Powell, it was easy
to reach the (universally accepted) conclusion that children are

"persons" within the meaning of those protected against unequal
protection of the laws by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 29 Thus, he saw it
as well within the power of the Court to strike as unconstitutional
statutes that barred dependent, unacknowledged children born out-ofwedlock from recovering statutory death benefits while allowing
acknowledged children to receive them.'30 This was also at the heart of

of unmarried woman under the age of eighteen years for nonemergency abortion is
unconstitutional); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975) (holding that a
city ordinance that prohibited showing films containing nudity by a drive-in movie theater when its
screen was visible from a public street or place was unconstitutionally overbroad).
127. See cases cited supra note 126. Justice Powell took part in the plurality or majority
opinion in all cases except the following: Wolman, 433 U.S. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Carey, 431 U.S. at 703 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 89 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring); Goss, 419 U.S.
at 584 (Powell, J., dissenting); Keyes, 413 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
128. This is not to say that Justice Powell treated age as a suspect classification. He did not.
Indeed, as will be shown, he was very comfortable treating children as different from adults. See
infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
129. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (stating that "[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights"); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (finding
that "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone").
130. See Weber, 406 U.S. at 169-70. Justice Powell stated:
So far as this record shows, the dependency and natural affinity of the unacknowledged
illegitimate children for their father were as great as those of the four legitimate children
whom Louisiana law has allowed to recover. The legitimate children and the illegitimate
children all lived in the home of the deceased and were equally dependent upon him for
maintenance and support.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776. In Trimble, the Court held that a state law
permitting children born out-of-wedlock to inherit via intestate succession only from their mothers,
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his reasoning in insisting that de facto school segregation violated the
Fourteenth Amendment just as much as de jure segregation. 3 '
Justice Powell was quite firm in his protection of family integrity
when the state attempted to disrupt a successful ongoing family in the
absence of any claim of parental unfitness or juvenile waywardness.'3 2 In
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 33 Justice Powell displayed a
willingness to invoke substantive due process as the express basis upon
which he protected an extended family's constitutional right to remain
together in a face of a zoning ordinance which required them to move
out of the community.' 34 He authored the plurality opinion which was
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun over very strong
dissents by3 Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, White and
Rehnquist. 1 1
He began his opinion in Moore by distinguishing between36
regulations in ordinary land use contexts and regulations of the family.1
When an ordinance involves regulation of the family, he wrote, "the
usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate."' 37 For Justice
Powell, "unless we close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights
associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we cannot avoid applying
the force and 38rationale of these precedents to the family choice involved
in this case."'
Justice Powell's opinion was particularly sensitive to the claim that
he may be creating a constitutional right based on his own values, rather
than enforcing an unenumerated right that is within constitutional
protection.'39 Particularly in light of Justice White's challenge in dissent
in contrast to children who were born to married parents and could be intestate takers from both
mother and father, violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id.
131. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 247-48 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
133. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
134. See id. at 501 (plurality opinion).
135. See id. at 521 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 531 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 541
(White, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 495-96. Two precedents stood in the way of striking the East Cleveland
ordinance and needed to be distinguished in order to reach the outcome reached by the plurality. In
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Court upheld a zoning ordinance imposing
limits on the types of groups of unrelated individuals that could occupy a single dwelling unit. See
id. at 2, 7. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Court held that landuse regulations violate the Due Process Clause only if they are "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id. at 395.
137. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion). He then went on to cite the long line of cases
supporting this principle. See id. (plurality opinion).
138. Id. at 501 (plurality opinion).
139. See id. at 502 (plurality opinion).
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to the plurality's use of substantive due process, Justice Powell felt the
need to defend both the ruling and the process by which he reached it.
As a result, the opinion is especially self-reflective about constitutional
interpretation and provided Justice Powell with an opportunity to explain
why the family is properly protected by the Constitution against state
encroachment.' ° In a famous passage, Justice Powell explained that the
Court's "decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we

140. See id. at 501-02 (plurality opinion). In an illuminating passage, Justice Powell strove to
justify his use of substantive due process to protect the Moore family's constitutional right to remain
a family unit despite lacking any textual support in the Constitution. He relied on some of Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman when he stated that:
"Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined
by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this
Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates
of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the
demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept
has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have
felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could
not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be
sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint."
...[Tihe full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in
the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of
the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and
bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, ... and which also recognizes, what a
reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful
scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.
Id. at 501-02 (plurality opinion) (citations and footnote omitted) (alteration and omission in
original) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice
Powell continued in his own words:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court. There
are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive
liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As
the history of the Loclmer era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only
limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the
time to be Members of this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint. But it does
not counsel abandonment, nor does it require what the city urges here: cutting off any
protection of family rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary boundary-the boundary of
the nuclear family.
Id. at 502 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
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inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and
cultural. ' 4'
Cases involving the operation of the public school and some
miscellaneous cases involving children in relation to sex-related health
care and the First Amendment provided Justice Powell with the chance
to express his views on the rights of children that bear more directly on
the issues in the abortion cases. Of these cases, the few that focused on
the public schools perhaps best reveal his deeper thoughts on the
relationship of children's rights when exercised in the context of their
disagreeing with their parent's or teacher's views on what is the best42
fall within this category: Goss v. Lopez
decision for them. Two cases
43
and Ingrahamv. Wright.1
In Goss, the Court held that under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, public school officials could not expel students
from school without first providing some kind of hearing and an
opportunity to be heard.'" Justice White wrote the opinion for the
Court.' 45 The record in Goss amply demonstrated that students were
suspended from schools many times for alleged violations of rules
without providing them with any chance to show they did nothing
wrong. 4 6 The decision was relatively straightforward and continued the
expansion of procedural due process requiring some kind of hearing
whenever state officials deprived someone of "property" based on
alleged behavior of the individual. 47 In Justice White's words, "[h]aving
chosen to extend the right to an education to people of appellees' class
generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct,
absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the
misconduct has occurred.' 48
However obvious the reasoning in Goss was to some, it triggered a
vigorous dissent from Justice Powell. 91 The Court's willingness to enter
into the subject of discipline in the public schools was of very recent
origin. The only case before Goss in which the Court had done so was its
141. Id. at 503-04 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
142. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
143. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
144. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 582-83.
145. See id. at567.
146. See id. at 584.
147. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254,261 (1970).
148. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. Justice White's reasoning continued: "[iut is apparent that the
claimed right of the State to determine unilaterally and without process whether that misconduct has
occurred immediately collides with the requirements of the Constitution." Id. at 575.
149. See id. at 584-600 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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1969 decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
5 Justice Powell made clear that
District.'
he believed the Court took a
wrong turn in Tinker when it saw fit to second-guess school officials
charged with the responsibility of educating and training students to be
obedient. 5 ' Justice Powell objected to federal courts exercising authority
to review and overrule school authorities. 5 2 For him, "school authorities
must have broad discretionary authority in the daily operation of public
schools."'53 These views were not driven by his sense of federalism so
much as they reflected his deeper notion that children need to be
disciplined for their own good.' He particularly emphasized
the long history of our law, recognizing that there are differences
which must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of
children as compared with those of adults. Examples of this distinction
abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal law and procedure,
in criminal sanctions and rehabilitation, and in the right to vote and to
hold office. Until today, and except in the special context of the First
Amendment issue in Tinker, the educational rights of children and
teenagers in the elementary and secondary schools have not been
analogized to the rights of adults or to those accorded college
students.' 5
For Justice Powell, "a student's interest in education is not infringed by
a suspension within the limited period prescribed by Ohio law."'56
Justice Powell expressed his view that limiting educational
authorities in their power to impose discipline would harm children's
true interests: "One who does not comprehend the meaning and
necessity of discipline is handicapped not merely in his education but
throughout his subsequent life."' 57 He was explicitly concerned with
what he perceived to be a breakdown in the social fabric through which
the traditional authorities shaped children into law-abiding adults:
In an age when the home and church play a diminishing role in shaping
the character and value judgments of the young, a heavier
responsibility falls upon the schools. When an immature student merits
censure for his conduct, he is rendered a disservice if appropriate
sanctions are not applied or if procedures for their application are so
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
See Goss, 419 U.S. at 589-90 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 585-86 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 589-90 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 590-91 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 585-86 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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formalized as to invite a challenge to the teacher's authority-an
invitation 5which rebellious or even merely spirited teenagers are likely
to accept. 8
Justice Powell's opinion most closely resembles what is perhaps the
strongest condemnation of the children's rights movement by a Supreme
Court Justice-Justice Black's stinging dissent in Tinker.'59 No Justice
joined Justice Black's dissent when he issued it; Justice Powell is the
only member of the Court since to have embraced it.' 60 For Justice
Powell, as for Justice Black, "'[s]chool discipline, like parental
discipline, is an integral and important part of training our children to be
good citizens-to be better citizens. ' " 16' He ended his Goss dissent by
quoting Justice Black's famous fear that Tinker would usher in "'an
entirely new era in which the power to control pupils by the elected
"officials of state supported public schools" . . . is in ultimate effect

transferred to the Supreme Court."" 62 Justice Powell expressed his view
that Justice Black's "prophecy is now being fulfilled.... One can only
speculate as to the extent to which public education will be disrupted by
giving every schoolchild the power to contest in court any decision
made by his teacher which arguably infringes the state-conferred right to
education."' 63 He wrote:
Education in any meaningful sense includes the inculcation of an
understanding in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience

thereto. This understanding is no less important than learning to read
and write. One who does not comprehend the meaning and necessity of

discipline is handicapped not merely in his education but throughout
his subsequent life.'64

Two years later, Justice Powell had the opportunity to stress the
values that are reflected in his Goss dissent when he authored the
Court's opinion in Ingraham v. Wright.'65 In that case, both parents and
children objected to the use of corporal punishment by school teachers
158. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
159. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. City. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515-26 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Goss, 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
161. Goss, 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
162. Id. at 600 n.22 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
163. Id. (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
164. Id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting).

165. 430U.S. 651 (1977).
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and officials in public school.' 66 Although in other cases Justice Powell
revealed a keen interest in protecting the family from state intrusion
before there is a reason to question the caretaking qualities of the
parents,'67 he had no problem ceding to state officials full authority to
16
discipline children when these officials are in a child rearing function. 1
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell upheld the use of corporal
punishment even when parents would prohibit its use as applied to their
children:
Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher as
deriving from the parents, the concept of parental delegation has been
replaced by the view-more consonant with compulsory education
laws-that the State itself may impose such corporal punishment as is
reasonably necessary "for the proper education of the child and for the
maintenance of group discipline."' 69
His views in Goss and Ingraham fit together very well. The opinion
reflects Justice Powell's view that children need firm discipline if they
are to be well-served by their caretakers. 70 A state should be given wide
latitude when in a quasi-parental function, he reasoned, because children
do best when raised by strict disciplinarians.'
Apart from the public school arena, Justice Powell expressed his
views on children's rights in a variety of other contexts, including
circumstances under which the state may restrict children's access to
sexually explicit, nonobscene materials'7 2 and various situations bearing
directly on children and sex.'
166. See id. at653.
167. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,498-99 (1977) (plurality opinion).
168. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 662.
169. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
170. Seeid. at681-82.
171. See id. Consider Justice Powell's views concerning a child's right to be free from being
hit by their teachers:
Because it is rooted in history, the child's liberty interest in avoiding corporal
punishment while in the care of public school authorities is subject to historical
limitations. Under the common law, an invasion of personal security gave rise to a right
to recover damages in a subsequent judicial proceeding. But the right of recovery was
qualified by the concept of justification. Thus, there could be no recovery against a
teacher who gave only "moderate correction" to a child. To the extent that the force used
was reasonable in light of its purpose, it was not wrongful, but rather "justifiable or
lawful."
Id. at 675-76 (citations omitted).
172. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1975).
173. See generally Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that New
York statute making it illegal to distribute contraceptives to minors is unconstitutional); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
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In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,14 the Court struck as
unconstitutionally overbroad an "ordinance that prohibit[ed] showing
films containing nudity by a drive-in movie theater when its screen
[was] visible from a public street or place.' 7 5 Justice Powell made clear
that he comfortably joined those Justices who permit "more stringent
controls on communicative materials available to youths than on those
available to adults."' 76 Although he added the familiar language that
"minors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment
protection and only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances
may government bar public dissemination of protected materials to
them,"' 177 he stressed that "[t]he First Amendment rights of minors are
not 'co-extensive with those of adults,'' 7' and made clear that
determining "whether a minor has the requisite capacity for individual
choice the age of the minor is a significant factor"' 79 in the degree to
which they may be denied ordinary First Amendment freedoms.' s
Last are two cases bearing directly on regulations concerning sex
and minors. Both are obviously highly pertinent to a study of Justice
Powell's views that would shape his decision in Bellotti. The first case is
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth8' itself. Justice Powell did not write
separately in Danforth. Although he voted to strike the statute as
unconstitutional, he distanced himself from those members of the Court
who appeared willing to liberate children to decide whether to terminate
their pregnancy on their own by joining Justice Stewart's concurrence
which emphasized that the "primary constitutional deficiency" of the
parental consent requirement is "its imposition of an absolute limitation
on the minor's right to obtain an abortion.' 82 Unlike Justice Blackmun's
majority opinion, the concurrence goes on to stress:
The Court's opinion today in Bellotti v. Baird suggests that a
materially different constitutional issue would be presented under a
provision requiring parental consent or consultation in most cases but
174. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
175. Id. at206-12.
176. Id. at 212 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
177. Id. at 212-13 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 214 n. 11 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515
(1969) (Stewart, J., concurring)). "'[A] State may permissibly determine that, at least in some
precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that
full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees."' Id.
(quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
179. Id. at 214 n.11.
180. See id.
181. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
182. Id. at 90 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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providing for prompt (i) judicial resolution of any disagreement
between the parent and the minor, or (ii) judicial determination that the
minor is mature enough to give an informed consent without parental
concurrence or that abortion in any event is in the minor's best interest.
Such a provision would not impose parental approval as an absolute
condition upon the minor's right but would assure in most instances
consultation between the parent and child.
There can be little doubt that the state furthers a constitutionally
permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek
the help and advice of her parents in making the very important
decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be83 ill-equipped to
make it without mature advice and emotional support.

Finally, in Carey v. Population Services International,'4 Justice
Powell wrote separately to distance himself from the plurality opinion
that struck as unconstitutional a New York statute that prohibited the
sale or distribution of contraceptives to persons under sixteen years of
age.'s The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, and joined by
Justices Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun, expressed the view that "the
right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation
extends to minors as -well as to adults."'' 6 But Justice Powell, disavowing
the plurality's notions, considered the principal defect in the law to be its
overbreadth because it applied even to. married minors under the age of
sixteen.' In Justice Powell's view, once the state sanctions a marriage
of a person of any age, the marital relationship is entitled to a zone of
183. Id. at 90-91 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations and footnote omitted).
184. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (plurality opinion).
185. See id. at 703 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
186. Id. at 693 (plurality opinion). Justices White and Stevens also voted to strike the statute
but on very different grounds from the plurality. Justice White expressly joined Justice Stevens's
famous declaration: .'I would describe as "frivolous" appellees' argument that a minor has the
constitutional right to put contraceptives to their intended use, notwithstanding the combined
objection of both parents and the State."' Id.at 702-03 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the result) (quoting id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
Nonetheless, Justice White concurred that the challenged statute was unconstitutional because "the
State has not demonstrated that the prohibition against distribution of contraceptives to minors
measurably contributes to the deterrent purposes which the State advances as justification for the
restriction." Id. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). Justice Stevens
voted to strike the statute because it was an arbitrary exercise of state power which he characterized
as a form of propaganda. See id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). He condemned the law being as foolish as one in which "a State decided to dramatize its
disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
187. See id. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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constitutionally protected privacy that includes the right to use
contraceptives if the couple so chooses.'88 A second reason he concluded
the statute is unconstitutional is that it prohibited parents from
distributing contraceptives to their children.' 89 But he would have none
of the plurality's ideas about children's rights to engage in sex or to
enjoy heightened scrutiny of state regulations over children's sexuallyrelated behavior.' 9° For Justice Powell, it is self-evident that it is
permissible to treat children differently from adults because they are less
mature than adults.'9 ' Because young people generally "lack the maturity
and understanding necessary to make decisions concerning marriage and
sexual relationships,"' 92 state regulations limiting a young person's
freedom in the area of procreation need only rationally further the state's
valid interests of child protection.' 93 Justice Powell considered it
constitutionally significant that "[p]articipation in sexual intercourse at
an early age may have both physical and psychological consequences." '94

188. See id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
189. See id. at 708 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
[Clonstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."
Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (internal quotations and citations
omitted) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). Justice Powell also believed
the statute's requirement that nonprescription contraceptives may only be distributed by pharmacists
was not justified by any rational basis. See id. at 710.
190. See id. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). "There is
also no justification for subjecting restrictions on the sexual activity of the young to heightened
judicial review. Under our prior cases, the States have broad latitude to legislate with respect to
adolescents." Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
191. Id. at 706 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He also quoted
with approval Justice Stevens's concurring and dissenting opinion in Danforth:
"Because he may not foresee the consequences of his decision, a minor may not make an
enforceable bargain. He may not lawfully work or travel where he pleases, or even
attend exhibitions of constitutionally protected adult motion pictures. Persons below a
certain age may not marry without parental consent. Indeed, such consent is essential
even when the young woman is already pregnant."
Id. at 706 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
192. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
193. See id. at 707 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
194. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Among these
consequences are:
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As a result, in his view the state "should have substantial latitude in
regulating the distribution of contraceptives to minors."' 95
The sum of Justice Powell's opinions reveal how deeply he
believed that strong discipline of children is an important state goal and
that children are disserved when liberated to make important choices for
themselves.'96 Of all the Justices who voted to free minors from their
parent's control when seeking an abortion, Justice Powell has been the
most consistent voice in opposition to the core idea that a minor has
fundamental liberty rights to make decisions for herself.'97
We are now ready to examine Justice Powell's plurality opinion in
Bellotti v. Baird.We should be prepared to understand Justice Powell as
someone who strongly tends to protect parental prerogatives to make
child rearing decisions, and particularly looks with askance at state
efforts to overrule parents or interfere in their child rearing capacity and,
especially, who is loathe to liberate children to make important decisions
for themselves.'98
C. The Bellotti Decision
In a companion case decided the same day as Danforth, the Court
considered a challenge to a Massachusetts statute that also required
parental consent for a minor to undergo an abortion.'" It was not clear
whether Massachusetts' parental consent requirement was absolute or
whether a minor had an opportunity to obtain a judicially authorized
abortion in the absence of parental consent.2 10 Consequently, in Bellotti
v. Baird, the Supreme Court abstained and certified questions to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for authoritative interpretation
[The risks of venereal disease and pregnancy, and the less obvious mental and
emotional problems that may result from sexual activity by children. Moreover, society
has long adhered to the view that sexual intercourse should not be engaged in
promiscuously, a judgment that an adolescent may be less likely to heed than an adult.
Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
195. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
196. For Justice Powell, it is good for children to always be subject to the control of some
adult. See id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (footnote
omitted). Even when children are arguably completely innocent, Justice Powell would rather them
suffer from wrongful suspensions from school than set into motion a procedural review mechanism
that may deter teachers in the future from seeking to discipline children who need it. See, e.g., Goss
dissenting).
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,593-94 (1975) (Powell, J.,
197. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
198. See, e.g., id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
199. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 133-34 (1976).
200. See id. at 134-35.
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of state law issues central to a ruling on the statute's constitutionality
under the Federal Constitution.2
In 1979, the case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court. 2 2 As
construed by the state high court, the statute retained a parental consent
requirement like the one struck down in Danforth, but this was
supplemented by extraordinary new powers granted to judges. Under the
Massachusetts law, pregnant minors were permitted to seek judicial
authorization to terminate a pregnancy after unsuccessfully seeking
permission from both parents. 3 Judges were instructed to approve the
abortion if they determined that the abortion would be in the minor's
best interests .2 ° Eight Justices agreed that the Massachusetts statute as
construed by the Supreme Judicial Court could not be sustained under
Danforth because the law merely transferred to the judge the identical
power to deny a minor an abortion that the Danforth Court voided when
exercised by a parent.2 0 5 Although minors were given an option in
Massachusetts not available to them in Missouri, the Massachusetts law
required judges to disapprove an abortion if they believed it would not
serve the child's best interests. 6
The Court declared the law unconstitutional in two plurality
opinions, each of which was joined by four Justices.m The first of these
opinions, written by Justice Powell and announcing the judgment of the
Court, was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice
0° The second opinion was written by Justice Stevens and was
Rehnquist.2
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. The second
opinion would have declared the statute unconstitutional without much
ceremony because "no minor in Massachusetts, no matter how mature
and capable of informed decisionmaking, may receive an abortion
without the consent of either both her parents or a superior court judge.
In every instance, the minor's decision to secure an abortion is subject to
201. Seeid. at 151.
202. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 631-33 (1979) (plurality opinion).
203. See id. at 625 (plurality opinion).
204. See id. at 630 (plurality opinion).
205. See id. at 651 (plurality opinion). One of these eight, then-Justice Rehnquist, explicitly
recognized that the Massachusetts statute could not survive Danforth,. See id. at 651-52 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist made clear that he would be happy to overrule Danforth, but that,
until a majority of the Court was willing to reconsider Danforth, he would help fashion rules that
regulate the field. See id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Only Justice White believed that the
Massachusetts law could survive constitutional challenge in light of Danforth. See id. at 656-57
(White, J., dissenting).
206. See id. at 654 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
207. See id. at 623-24 (plurality opinion).
208. See id. at 623 (plurality opinion).
209. See id. at 624 (plurality opinion).
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an absolute third-party veto. ' However, Justice Powell chose a very
different route. Although Justice Powell's opinion did not overrule
Danforth, it rendered Danforth effectively meaningless as constitutional
precedent for minors. 21" He accomplished this by informing states that
they may compel minors to seek judicial approval so long as judges are
authorized
to approve the abortion if they find the minor to be
"mature. ' ,21 2 For Justice Powell, this proved to be the key that was
lacking in the Massachusetts statute before the Court in Bellotti.2 3
The significant difference between the result of Justice Powell's
opinion and the result that would have been achieved merely by striking
the law as unconstitutional is that his opinion refused to liberate
pregnant minors to obtain abortions when they wanted one. 2 4 Justice
Stevens accused Justice Powell of issuing an advisory opinion.215 Justice
Powell defended his choice to issue his opinion (without disputing that it
was answering hypothetical questions not presented in the case) as
simply an "attempt to provide some guidance as to how a State
constitutionally may provide for adult involvement-either by parents or
a state official such as a judge-in the abortion decisions of minors. 216
Eventually, the statute he advised states to enact was upheld by a
majority of the Court.2 7
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 653-54 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted).
See id. at 650 (plurality opinion).
See id. (plurality opinion).
See id. at 650-51 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 654 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
See id.at 656 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Until and unless Massachusetts or another State enacts a less restrictive statutory
scheme, this Court has no occasion to render an advisory opinion on the constitutionality
of such a scheme. A real statute-rather than a mere outline of a possible statute-and a
real case or controversy may well present questions that appear quite different from the
hypothetical questions Mr. Justice Powell has elected to address.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
216. Id. at 651 n.32 (plurality opinion).
217. Since 1979, the Court has consistently approved judicial bypass procedures-provided
they authorize a judge to approve the abortion procedure without parental consent upon a
determination that the minor was sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision, or that the
abortion was in her best interests. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992)
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (reaffirming "that a State may require a minor
seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate
judicial bypass procedure"). Although the Bellotti criteria for waiver provisions were upheld by a
majority of the Court only in 1990 in Ohio v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502,
510-14 (1990), in 1983, the Court upheld a Missouri parental consent statute that contained a
judicial bypass provision. See Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493 (1983); see also
Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 298 (1997) (per curiam); Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (joint opinion
of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 455 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 441-42 (1983),
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Justice Powell's decision is, perhaps, as oddly structured as issuing
an advisory opinion is unusual. The first half of the opinion summarized
various aspects of the law on the rights of children.1 s Justice Powell
observed first, citing In re Gault, that "the Fourteenth Amendment...
[is not] ... for adults alone. 21 9 He added, quite properly, that "[tlhis
observation ... is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has
recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects., 220 Then he continued by stressing that the family is "the
institution by which 'we inculcate and pass down many of our most
cherished values, moral and cultural."' 22' He concluded this brief
overview of the law by summarizing the reasons children do not possess
the same constitutional rights as adults:
[T]he peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the
parental role in child rearing.

... Viewed together, our cases show that although children
generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against
governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust
its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs
for "concern .... sympathy, and.., paternal attention. 22
After this summary of children's rights, his opinion focused on the
role of the family and parents in raising children. His opinion stressed
that:
[T]he guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children
justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their
own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
218. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-39 (plurality opinion).
219. Id. at 633 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
220. Id. (plurality opinion). Quoting Justice Frankfurter in a 1963 decision, he noted that
"'[c]hildren have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their
phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to
determination of a State's duty towards children."' Id. at 633-34 (plurality opinion) (quoting May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
221. Id. at 634 (plurality opinion) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 50304 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
222. Id. at 634-35 (plurality opinion) (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550
(1971)).
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important decisions by minors. But an additional and more important
justification for state deference to parental control over children is
that .... [the] affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring
by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.)
He emphasized that the state cannot ordinarily play the role of
raising children. 4 In his words, it is "beyond the competence of
impersonal political institutions" because "affirmative sponsorship of
particular ethical, religious, or political beliefs is something we expect
the State not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice."2 5 For this reason,
Justice Powell reminded the reader that our society relies heavily on
parents, observing that "the tradition of parental authority is not
inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is
one of the basic presuppositions of the latter." 6
Finally, Justice Powell turned to the case before the Court. He
began this part of his opinion by stressing that the Court had already
held in Danforth (and he made no attempt to revisit the propriety of the
holding, considering it stare decisis) "that a State could not lawfully
authorize an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy. ' ' 2l In careful wording, he wrote that "[t]he
question before us-in light of what we have said in prior cases-is
whether [the challenged statute] provides for parental notice and consent
in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to seek an abortion." 2"
Justice Powell concluded that a parental notice and consent
requirement is permissible because "[a]s immature minors often lack the
ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both
immediate and long-range consequences, a State reasonably may
223. Id. at 637-38 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
224. See id. at 638 (plurality opinion).
225. Id. (plurality opinion).
226. Id. (plurality opinion). He went on to say that "[l]egal restrictions on minors ... may be
important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in
a free society meaningful and rewarding." Id. at 638-39. He completed this discussion by citing
Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:Some Reservations About
Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 BYU L. REV. 605. See id. at 639 n.17 (plurality
opinion). Professor Hafen is one of the strongest voices against children's rights who stresses that
both children and society are well-served by keeping control over them. See Hafen, supra, at 658.
He ends by citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968): "'[Plarents and others, teachers for
example, who have [the] primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support
of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."' Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 639 (plurality
opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639).
227. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 639 (plurality opinion).
228. Id. at 640 (plurality opinion).
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determine that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best
interest of the minor., 229 Indeed, he quoted from Justice Stewart's
Danforthconcurrence (which he had joined):
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally
permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek
the help and advice of her parents in making the very important
decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision .... It
seems unlikely that she will obtain adequate counsel and support from
the attending physician at an abortion
clinic, where abortions for
23 0
pregnant minors frequently take place.

After this, he returned to the subject of a child's constitutional
rights, with the observation that "we are concerned here with a
constitutional right to seek an abortion. The abortion decision differs in
important ways from other decisions that may be made during
minority.""1 Stressing the importance of the abortion decision to a
pregnant minor, he observed "considering her probable education,
employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity,
unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a
minor.... In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make
an important decision will have consequence so grave and
indelible. '' 3
Although Justice Powell declared that "the unique nature and
consequences of the abortion decision [render it] inappropriate 'to give a
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision, ''' '
this is really only his explanation for Danforth's rule that parents may
not arbitrarily veto their child's decision to terminate her pregnancy. It
turns out that the only "third party" to which Justice Powell was
referring is the parent.2 4
229. Id. (plurality opinion).
230. Id. at 640-41 (plurality opinion) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)). He also emphasized how unlikely it is that a minor will obtain
meaningful counseling at an abortion clinic where "'[c]ounseling is typically limited to a description
of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques .... [and] [tihe
physician has no prior contact with the minor .. .- Id. at 641 n.21 (plurality opinion) (quoting
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 91-92 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
231. Id. at 642 (plurality opinion). One of the differences between this decision and many
others is that this decision cannot be postponed or even preserved for long. See id.
232. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74).
233. Id. at 643 (plurality opinion).
234. Because Justice Powell chose to rely on Danforth's rule that parents may not be
authorized to veto their child's decision to terminate her pregnancy as settled law, he did not bother
to explain the rationale of the holding. Not a word can be found in his opinion that even attempts to
justify the rule that parents should be denied their theretofore presumptive, almost sacrosanct, right.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss3/1

36

Guggenheim: Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases
20021

THE ADOLESCENTABORTION CASES

Justice Powell next stressed that "an abortion may not be the best
choice for the minor." 23 For this reason, he was searching to find a
parental surrogate who can review the child's desire to terminate a
pregnancy and exercise a "veto" over her decision.f 6 The key for Justice
Powell was to find someone who would wield this authority in a
nonarbitrary way. 2 7 In the final portion of his opinion, he identified this
third party as the judge2 8
A recasting of Justice Powell's reasoning in the form of a sequence
of arguments helps to highlight the circumlocution of the opinion. His
argument in the analytical portion of his opinion is made in the
following order: (1) children have constitutional rights; 9 (2) ordinarily
parents make all important decisions for their children because children
are too immature to make decisions for themselves; 240 (3) the abortion
decision is distinctive because it cannot be postponed; 24' (4) for this
2 42
reason a child's choice to abort cannot be arbitrarily denied;
(5) parents are not permitted to deny their children an abortion
"arbitrarily"; 243 (6) pregnant minors, like children generally, will not
necessarily elect the option that best serves their interests; 24 (7) and
therefore when states want the minor's abortion decision to be
authorized by someone other than a minor, it must give this power to the
24 5
state, not the parent.
This is a strange, convoluted order of argumentation. By beginning
his discussion about the constitutional rights of children, the case has
come to be seen as vindicating children's rights. But the holding does no
such thing.
The reasoning that logically undergirds the Bellotti plurality
provides a strikingly different perspective: (1) children presumptively do
not have constitutional rights to make important life decisions for
themselves because they are too immature; (2) ordinarily we rely on
parents to make decisions for their children; (3) when it comes to the
abortion decision, however, it is impermissible to rely on parents to
authorize their children to terminate a pregnancy (perhaps for the simple
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 642 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 643 (plurality opinion).
See id. (plurality opinion).
See id. at 647-48 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 633 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 637-38 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 643 (plurality opinion).
See id. (plurality opinion).
See id. (plurality opinion).
See id at 647 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 647-48 (plurality opinion).
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reason that Danforth so dictates); (4) and therefore the state is
empowered to authorize children to terminate their pregnancy.
This more straight-forward reasoning reveals the degree to which
Justice Powell's plurality opinion fails to advance children's rights. This
result will not surprise readers familiar with Justice Powell's general
views on children's rights. It should become even less surprising when
we account for the Justices who saw fit to join his opinion. Justice
Powell's plurality was comprised of two Justices who dissented in
Danforth (Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist) and Justice
Stewart (who, along with Justice Powell, concurred separately in
Danforth). 6
The first of these Justices, Chief Justice Burger, could never be
mistaken for a children's rights advocate. He dissented in In re
Winship,247 preferring that accused delinquents be subject to
incarceration based on a preponderance of evidence. 48 He joined the
majority in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,249 denying accused juvenile
delinquents the right to trial by jury.5 0 He dissented in Goss v. Lopez," '
and would have allowed students to be suspended from school based on
alleged infractions without providing them an opportunity to be heard.5 2
He joined the majority in Ingraham v. Wright,23 voting to uphold the
practice of students being corporally punished in public schools,14 Most
importantly, he dissented in Danforth v. Planned Parenthooditself and
fully joined Justice White's dissenting opinion.5 He also authored the
Court's opinion in Parham v. J.R 6 (decided a mere twelve days before
Bellotti) which upheld the institutionalization of children in hospitals
without providing them with an opportunity for judicial review of their
detainment.57
Justice Stewart has hardly a better record on children's rights. He
dissented both in Gault and Winship.5 He voted with the Court in
246. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 89 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 92 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
248. See id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
249. 403 U.S. 528, 530 (1971).
250. See id. at 545.
251. 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting).
252. See id. at 585-86 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting).
253. 430 U.S. 651, 652 (1977).
254. See id. at 676.
255. 428 U.S. 52, 92 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
256. 442 U.S. 584, 587 (1979).
257. See id. at 613.
258. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (Burger, C.J., joined by Stewart, J.,
dissenting); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 78 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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McKeiver,2'9 and voted with the majority in Ingraham.260 His separate
concurrence in Danforth (which was joined by Justice Powell) clearly
indicates that he and Justice Powell all along were unwilling to give
children anything other than the entitlement to petition a judge for the
right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.26' Finally, Justice Rehnquist, a
dissenter in and outspoken critic of Danforth, acknowledged in Bellotti
itself that he continued to view Danforth as incorrectly decided, even as
he strategically joined the Powell opinion to deny Justice Stevens the
chance to announce the judgment for the Court by issuing his fourperson plurality opinion.262
Revisiting Danforth through the lens of the Bellotti holding, it
becomes clear that Danforth is not, after all, a children's rights case.
Ordinarily, transferring power over a child from one's parents to the
state is the antithesis of recognizing rights in children."3 With hindsight,
we can recognize that the net result of Danforth is a denial of
constitutional rights to parents, not a granting of constitutional rights to
children. In Danforth, parents lost their previously recognized rights to
decide all nonemergency medical decisions for their unemancipated
children.264 But, for children, guardianship was merely transferred from
their parents to the state.65
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MINOR ABORTION CASES

With the benefit of hindsight, we may now see that the
constitutional rights of minors in the area of privacy reached a zenith in
the years 1976 and 1977. The combination of the 1976 Danforth
decision and the 1977 decision in Carey v. Population Services
International,2 had the potential to rewrite the rules concerning
children's rights. For better or worse, a powerful retrenchment set in
shortly thereafter from which the children's rights movement has not
recovered.

259. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,530 (1971).
260. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 652 (1977).
261. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 90-91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
262. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,651-52 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
263. As Justice Stevens wrote in his plurality opinion in Bellotti, under Justice Powell's rule
"every minor who cannot secure the consent of both her parents-which under Danforth cannot be
an absolute prerequisite to an abortion-is required to secure the consent of the sovereign." Id. at
655 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
264. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
265. See supra note 263.
266. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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As we have seen, Danforth declared that pregnant minors have a
constitutional right to privacy that barred their parents from vetoing their
decision to terminate a pregnancy.267 Carey seemed to go even further in
declaring unconstitutional a New York statute that prohibited the sale or
distribution of contraceptives to persons under sixteen years of age.26'
However, the section of Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court which
announced that "the right to privacy in connection with decisions
affecting procreation extends to minors as well as to adults,'2 69 only
garnered three other votes-a plurality.270 These words did not attract a
fifth vote and there has never been majority sentiment on the Court for
the notion that children have constitutional rights to procreational
privacy.
Although three other Justices concurred in Carey striking the
statute, their reasoning deserves careful attention because it so well
captures the important distinction between the unconstitutionality of a
statute which affects children (but is unconstitutional for reasons other
than the rights of children) and the constitutional rights of children
themselves.27 ' These Justices expressly rejected the claim that minors
under sixteen have a constitutional right to privacy in the area of
procreation.7 We have already seen that Justice Powell considered the
statute to be overbroad because it applied even to married minors and
because it prohibited even parents from distributing contraceptives to
their minor children2 73
Justices White and Stevens also voted to strike the statute on very
different grounds from the plurality. 2 4 Justice White expressly joined
Justice Stevens's famous declaration: "I would describe as 'frivolous'
appellees' argument that a minor has the constitutional right to put
contraceptives to their intended use, notwithstanding the combined
objection of both parents and the State." 275 Nonetheless, Justice White
concurred that the challenged statute was unconstitutional because "the
State has not demonstrated that the prohibition against distribution of
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
(Stevens,
273.
274.
(Stevens,
275.
(Stevens,

See Danforth,428 U.S. at 74.
See Carey, 431 U.S. at 681-82.
Id. at 693 (plurality opinion).
Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun joined the plurality opinion. See id. at 680.
Justices White, Powell, and Stevens also voted to strike the statute. See id.
See id. at 702-03 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result); id. at 713
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 707 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result); id. at 712
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 702-03 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result) (quoting id. at 713
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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contraceptives to minors measurably contributes to the deterrent
purposes which the State advances as justification for the restriction." 76
Justice Stevens voted to strike the statute because it was an arbitrary
exercise of state power which he characterized as a form of
propaganda.77 He condemned the law for being as foolish as one in
which "a State decided to dramatize its disapproval of motorcycles by
forbidding the use of safety helmets."2' s
By 1979, in Bellotti v. Baird,the conservatives on the Court built a
coalition whose purpose was to deny children constitutional rights to
privacy. But, given the diverse views of the Justices, the particular
compromise reached in Bellotti is very odd, indeed. Based on the
combination of voting in Danforth and Bellotti, three Justices would
give children adult-like constitutional rights of privacy, at least in the
area of reproductive freedom; 279 six would not.28 0 Of these six, however,
four were content to leave children under the protection and guidance of
their parents.28 Only two-Justices Stewart and Powell-while agreeing
with the conservatives that children should remain under the control of
adults-preferred state judges over parents as the protectors of
children. 2 But through strategic voting,2 these two dominated the final
result in which children's custody was shifted from their parents to
the state.

276. Id. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
277. See id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
278. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell also
disavowed the plurality's notion that children have a constitutional right to privacy, but regarded the
principal defect in New York's law to be its overbreadth because it applied even to married minors
under the age of sixteen. See id. at 707 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). In Justice Powell's view, once the state sanctions a marriage of a person of any age, the
marital relationship is entitled to a zone of constitutionally protected privacy that includes the right
to use contraceptives if the couple so chooses. See id. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). A second reason he concluded the statute was unconstitutional is that it
prohibited parents from distributing contraceptives to their children. See id. at 708 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
279. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52,54 (1976).
280. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Rehnquist, Powell, and Stevens. See id.
281. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and Stevens. See id. at 95, 102.
282. See id. at 74.
283. Of the Justices who dissented in Danforth, only Justice Stevens took the position that,
given Danforth's rule that parents may not veto a minor's decision to terminate a pregnancy, state
judges are also barred from doing so. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 656 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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Reconceiving the MinorAbortion Cases as Clashes Between
Parentsand the State

In retrospect, it is apparent that the adolescent abortion cases are
not really about children's rights. They represent, instead, a titanic fight
between adults over the control of children. In this fight, the state
defeated parents. But in telling the story of the dispute, Justice Powell
worked a small miracle in spinning a yam about children's rights.
In order for Justice Powell's opinion to make even modest sense in
constitutional terms, he would have had to reach the startling conclusion
that pregnant minors were oppressed by their parents. Of course, he
concluded no such thing. Nonetheless, having characterized the clash of
rights raised by the case as being between minors and their parents, his
opinion appeared to be a victory for children's rights over parental
prerogative. Indeed, his opinion did more than merely divest parents of
the power to prevent their children from terminating a pregnancy; the
opinion held that it is unconstitutional even to require minors to consult
or notify their parents in the first place. 84 In the plurality's words, "every
minor must have the opportunity-if she so desires-to go directly to a
court without first consulting or notifying her parents." ' 5
It is highly telling, however, that Justice Powell's opinion contains
nothing that can be said to implement the Danforth holding. To
demonstrate this, we need only consider what the simple result of
implementing Danforth should have been. Danforth held that the
constitutional infirmity of a statute requiring parental consent for a
minor's abortion was that parents are prohibited from exercising a
"possibly arbitrary[] veto. 'z6 Accordingly, the obvious rule that follows
from this would be to require the child first to ask her parent and then
permit the minor to go to court if the parent falls to consent in a timely
fashion. Moreover, once before the court, the proper question would be
whether the parent's decision was "arbitrary." The logic of the Danforth
ruling not only would leave parents with the power to exercise their
parental authority in the first instance; the reviewing court would have to
apply a presumption that the parent's decision was not arbitrarym with
the child carrying the burden to show otherwise.
284. See id. at 647 (plurality opinion).
285. Id. (plurality opinion). Of course, a judge may determine that the minor must inform her
parents on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 648 (plurality opinion).
286. Id. at 643 (plurality opinion).
287. How could it be otherwise without repudiating fifty years of constitutional law? Under
Justice Powell's reasoning, how can it follow that just because a parent may exercise a possibly
arbitrary decision, she is deprived of the right to exercise a nonarbitrary one?
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Even if Justice Powell did not require a presumption of parental
correctness, surely he would insist that parents be given a chance to
participate in the judicial review and, at a minimum, to explain their
reasons for opposing the abortion. Nothing in Danforth even hints that a
parent's "nonarbitrary" refusal to consent to her child's abortion is
unconstitutional. How, following Danforth'sreasoning, could the law do
more than authorize judges to supervene a parental decision provided the
court concludes that parental decision ought not be upheld for whatever
reason?
Moreover, when we reconsider the Danforth reasoning that led to
striking the Missouri law, the Bellotti result becomes utterly
insupportable. Danforth, it will be recalled, held that Missouri's parental
consent law was unconstitutional because the state may not delegate a
power it does not have in the first place.2s Yet, startlingly, the Bellotti
plurality declared three years later that the state has this power after
all.2 9 At the least, the Bellotti plurality would say, the state has the
power to veto a child's request to have an abortion. 290 Although the state
may not exercise the veto power in an arbitrary fashion, the Missouri
law never afforded parents an arbitrary veto power either. The Missouri
29' That is
statute merely authorized parents to grant or withhold consent.
2
state.
the
to
assigned
plurality
Bellotti
the
power
the precise
For this result even to begin to make constitutional sense, Justice
Powell would have had to conclude that what differentiates judges from
parents is the inevitable objectivity of a judicial officer.2 93 Here the
reasoning must be that judges are neutral and detached, like magistrates
issuing search warrants, but that parents (like police officers?) may be
too close to the situation to possess the appropriate perspective. But can
anyone seriously believe that the requirement of parental consent for an
abortion exposes a minor to the risk of arbitrary exercise of power but
288. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
289. See Bellotti,443 U.S. at 643 (plurality opinion).
290. See id. at 647 (plurality opinion).
291. See Danforth,428 U.S. at 58.
292. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647 (plurality opinion).
293. One searches in vain for even a sentence by Justice Powell about what elevates judges
over parents as better fit or more logically empowered to grant or deny a pregnant minor's request
to terminate her pregnancy. The closest Justice Powell comes to even discussing the topic is his
quotation from the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion authoritatively interpreting the statute that
judges "'must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based
exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests."' Id. at 644 (plurality opinion) (quoting
Baird v. Attomey Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 293 (Mass. 1977)). Stunningly, parents were divested of
their constitutional rights-not really because of the child's rights-but because parents are not as
well suited as judges to make the correct decision for their children.
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the requirement of a judge's consent does not?29' The next section
addresses this and related questions.
B. Court Proceduresin the Bypass Process
The discerning reader might object that I still have not made the
case that the abortion decisions do not recognize the constitutional rights
of minors. Pursuant to these decisions, it can be said that minors have a
295
right to petition a court to gain permission to terminate a pregnancy.
Moreover, courts are obliged to give permission based on clearly defined
standards established by the Supreme Court. 6 Why aren't these
procedures, combined with the substantive rules they incorporate,
examples of constitutional rights of minors?
To answer this, we need to shift our focus to the role of the judge in
these cases. Once before the court, the minor's "rights" turn out to be
considerably less than is immediately apparent. All that the abortion
cases establish as a matter of federal constitutional law is that, in those
states that see fit to so command,297 a pregnant minor may be forced to
appear before an agent of the state to plead her entitlement to terminate
her pregnancy. 29 If she is not mature, she has no right in any sense to an
abortion.2 9 In such circumstances, the state will authorize the abortion

294. As Professor Burt asks, did Justice Powell:
[A]ssume that parents are "possibly arbitrary" but that judges or other state officials are
not? That judges can discern a child's maturity or best interests while her parents
cannot? That judges' possible arbitrariness can be constrained, while parents' cannot, by
the crystalline clarity of the 'maturity' and 'best interests' standard that he posits?
Robert A. Burt, The Constitutionof the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 329, 337-38.
295. See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644 (plurality opinion).
296. See id. at 647-48 (plurality opinion).
297. Many states have seen fit not to employ the complicated judicial bypass procedures which
the Supreme Court has upheld. See Scott, supra note 11, at 572 n.97 (citing a number of states
which enacted laws expressly deeming pregnant minors adults for purposes of deciding whether or
not to carry a fetus to term). Because this Article is strictly limited to an inquiry of federal
constitutional rights of children, it will not address the few (and growing) state cases that rely on
state constitutions to find constitutional rights of minors. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997) (striking California's law because it offended the minor's
right to state constitution's right to privacy); Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 621
(N.J. 2000) (striking, on equal protection grounds, New Jersey's judicial bypass statute because it
impermissibly treats different classes of young women-those who seek an abortion and those who
seek medical and/or surgical care related to pregnancy and childbirth).
298. The judge is authorized to veto the abortion unless he or she is "persuaded by the minor
that she is mature or that the abortion would be in her best interests." Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 648
(plurality opinion).
299. See id. (plurality opinion).
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only if a judge believes the procedure will serve the minor's best
interests.
Even if she is mature, strictly speaking she has no right to decide
for herself to terminate the abortion until a judge declares her to be
mature.' This is anything but a small distinction. In any legal
proceeding, there is the potential for disjunction between the "real facts"
and the findings by a court or jury. However, when the question before
the finder of fact is one so inherently empty as determining in a few
minutes the degree of a scared, pregnant minor's "maturity," in abortion
proceedings there is the likelihood whatever legal determination reached
by the court is arbitrary-almost utterly without meaning.'
Consider how easily a judge may rule the minor is not mature.
There are no standards in the law; nor can there be. Elizabeth Scott
recently described how a Utah judge, obviously hostile to minors having
the right to terminate an abortion, claimed to be faithfully applying the
maturity test in concluding that a seventeen-year-old "good student" was
300. See id. (plurality opinion). Moreover, the judge is empowered by the Bellotti plurality
opinion to require that a minor consult with her parents if the judge "concludes that her best
interests would be served thereby." Id. (plurality opinion). Having allowed minors the chance to
attempt to bypass her parents' involvement altogether by going directly to court if the minor so
chooses, Justice Powell ruled that the Massachusetts requirement of obtaining consent of both
parents is constitutional. See id. at 649 (plurality opinion). Because "[t]he abortion decision has
implications far broader than those associated with most other kinds of medical treatment" and
because "[c]onsent and involvement by parents in important decisions by minors long have been
recognized as protective of their immaturity," so long as "every pregnant minor is entitled in the
first instance to go directly to the court.., the general rule with respect to parental consent does not
unduly burden the constitutional right." Id. (plurality opinion).
301. See id. at 647-48 (plurality opinion). There is neither any presumption that the pregnant
minor is mature, nor that an abortion is in her best interests. See id. (plurality opinion). If there were
such a presumption, the law would be radically different. This different law would permit minors to
engage with physicians to perform desired medical procedures so long as the physician
independently ascertains that the minor is sufficiently mature to understand the nature of the
procedure and the attendant risks. When a physician is unable to conclude that the minor is mature,
then the minor would be required to go to court to seek a judge's determination. Under this
imagined rule, one could say that mature minors have a right to terminate a pregnancy because
mature minors would not be burdened in the first instance when invoking their right. But under the
Bellotti rule, all minors, including mature minors, are burdened to petition a court to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that they are mature. See id. (plurality opinion). Thus, the only "right" of
a minor is to ask a court to deem the minor eligible to consent on her own.
302. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens stated:
[Tihe only standard provided for the judge's decision is the best interest of the minor.
That standard provides little real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily
reflect personal and societal values and mores whose enforcement upon the minorparticularly when contrary to her own informed and reasonable decision-is
fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underlying the constitutional protection
afforded to her decision.
Id. at 655-56 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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not mature because "she lived at home, engaged in sexual activity
without contraceptives, sought counsel from friends rather than family
members or church officials, and failed to recognize the long-term
consequences of abortion."3 3 For this judge, all minors who would use
the bypass procedure are by definition immature. Remarkably, one could
just as easily reach the opposite conclusion and reason that every time a
minor seeks an abortion, a judge must grant it. In Robert Mnookin's
words: "[H]ow could the judge determine that it is in the interest of a
minor to give birth to a child if she is too immature even to decide to
have an abortion?"' ' 4 This is the expected consequence when courts are
empowered to determine an inherently empty question. Professor
Mnookin brilliantly demonstrated more than twenty-five years ago the
vacuity of standards when judges decide matters based on a child's "best
interests."' 30 Mnookin's trenchant dissection of the best interests
standard as a mode of adjudication is highly pertinent here.
Citing Lon Fuller, Mnookin identified the special qualities of these
proceedings. First, judges are expected to make "'person-oriented,' not
'act-oriented,' determinations. ' 6 Second, the judge must make his or
her determination not on the basis of past acts and facts, but on a
prediction of future events.0 7 This means, in turn, that precedent is
almost never helpful to the decisionmaker in deciding the matter before
him or her and that the scope of appellate review becomes "extremely
limited."3 8 As a consequence, the judge's "discretion is very wide
indeed."3°9
Even more importantly, however, Mnookin stresses, again citing
Fuller, that when a judge decides a matter based on the best interests of
the child, she is
"not applying law or legal rules at all, but is exercising administrative
discretion which by its nature cannot be rule-bound. The statutory
admonitions to decide the question ... so as to advance the welfare of
the child is as remote from being a rule of law as an instruction to the
303. Scott, supra note 11, at 574 n.1 10 (discussing H.B. v. Wilkenson, 639 F. Supp. 952, 95556 (D. Utah 1986)).
304. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY,LAW REFORM, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 263 (1985).
305. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions iz the Face of
Indeterminacy,39 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 230 (1975).
306. Id. at 250 (quoting LON FULLER, INTERACTION BETWEEN LAW AND ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT
8(1971)).
307. Seeid. at251.
308. See id. at 253-54.
309. Id. at 254.
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manager of a state-owned factory that he should follow the principle of
maximizing output at the least cost to the state."3 '

Among the problems with this kind of adjudication, Mnookin
emphasizes an inescapable fundamental problem. He asks, "[w]hat set of
values should a judge use to determine what is in a child's best
interests?" '' Should best interests
be viewed from a long-term or short-term perspective.... Should the
judge ask himself what decision will make the child happiest in the
next year? Or at thirty? Or at seventy? Should the judge decide by
thinking about what decision the child as an adult looking back would
have wanted made?...
Deciding what is best for a child -poses
• 312 a question no less ultimate
than the purposes and values of life itself.
We may reasonably substitute the term "maturity" for "best
interests" and Professors
Fuller and Mnookin's critiques of the judge's
31
role remain just as apt. 1
The ultimate decision by the judge whether or not to consent to the
minor's abortion procedure is virtually no substantive right at all. In the
adolescent abortion cases, minors gained only a procedural right not
much more substantial than an alien's right to petition the Attorney
General to suspend deportation, which Justice Scalia recently
characterized as "'an act of grace' which is accorded pursuant to her
'unfettered discretion. ' ' 31 4 This point is not mitigated by the evidence
that almost all petitions are granted. 5 My point is that any judge on any
given day could conclude both that the pregnant minor appearing in
court is not mature and that the abortion is not in her best interests. In
such circumstances, that minor does not have any right to terminate her

310. Id. at 255 (alteration in original) (quoting FULLER, supra note 306, at 11).
311. Id. at260.
312. Id.
313. As Justice Marshall noted in his opinion in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990),
"[i]t is difficult to conceive of any reason, aside from a judge's personal opposition to abortion, that
would justify a finding that an immature woman's best interests would be served by forcing her to
endure pregnancy and childbirth against her will." Id. at 475 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
314. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 390 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
315. See infra note 378. To the contrary, that all the petitions are granted demonstrates the
hidden public health issues that really drive this subject. See infra note 378 and accompanying text.
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pregnancy, whether or not the judge's rulings are correct or even
reasonable." 6
This is not to say minors gained nothing from the abortion
decisions. Precisely speaking, the "right" pregnant minors gained from
the abortion decisions is an option to seek approval from one of two
adults. This is not insignificant. Before Danforth,minors were obliged to
seek permission from their parents to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy. 7 After Bellotti, minors have a choice to seek permission
from their parents or a judge.3 "s To this extent, minors gained something.
At the same time, the Powell plurality opinion effortlessly pronounced
that a child's constitutional right is violated when a parent exercises a
veto of the minor's decision to terminate a pregnancy, yet advanced
when a judge is the adult who refuses the abortion. 3 9 By characterizing
this process as a minor's constitutional right, we denigrate the meaning
of constitutional rights themselves.
C. Adolescents Do Not Have a ConstitutionalRight to Privacy
As is well known, the right to terminate a pregnancy is best
understood as a component (or manifestation) of the broader
constitutional right to privacy and autonomy. ° If someone does not
possess the broader constitutional right to privacy and autonomy of
which the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy is a subset, then one
cannot possess the constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy.
The first case to hold that pregnant women have a constitutional
right to abort a nonviable fetus was Roe v. Wade.12 ' As important (and
controversial) as the decision was, however, all recognize that the case is
part of a larger body of law which established the constitutional right to
privacy. 32 When the general right was first articulated by Justice Harlan
in his famous dissent in Poe v. Ullman,3 2 the right was expressly
grounded in the right of privacy.32 4 As Justice Harlan expressed it:

316. She will, of course, possess a right to appeal. But now we are drifting ever further from a
right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy to a right to seek judicial review of a trial level
determination on the pregnant minor's maturity and best interests.
317. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 58 (1976).
318. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (plurality opinion).
319. See id. at 649 (plurality opinion).
320. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
321. See id. at 153.
322. See id.
323. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
324. See id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of
the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the
right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints ....
325
By the time of Griswold v. Connecticut,326 Justice Douglas found

the right to be protected by the penumbra of rights located in the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.327

In 1972, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Eisenstadt v.
Baird,3 was able to enlarge the right from Griswold's marital privacy to

one of self-expression, intimacy, privacy, and autonomy.329 Thus, under
Eisenstadt, adults have the right to engage in sex with partners of their

choice and to use contraceptives if they so desire.330 However
controversial Roe v. Wade33' was, the controversy was over the

application of the privacy right to terminating a pregnancy (with the
consequence of an individual's right adversely affecting another's
potential life). 332 In 1992, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,333 Justices

O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy articulated a woman's right to an
abortion as part of "the heart of liberty ... to define one's own concept

of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of
'334
State.
the
of
compulsion
under
formed
they
were
personhood

325. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
326. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
327. See id. at 484. Laurence Tribe recently observed the slight difference between the means
used by Justice Harlan and Justice Douglas to identify privacy rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities
Revival Portendthe Future-orReveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REv. 110, 170
(1999). Comparing Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Grisvold with Justice Harlan's dissent in
Poe,Professor Tribe observed that Justice Douglas:
[U]sed essentially the same type of analysis-although he spoke there in the more
passive language of discerning the shadows cast by the distinct points marked out by the
Bill of Rights, rather than in the more active language of drawing the lines needed to
connect those points so as to define a coherent picture.
Id.
328. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
329. See id. at 453.
330. See id. at 443.
331. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf-A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920,947 (1973).
332. See Roe v.%vade, 410 U.S. 113,159 (1973).
333. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
334. Id. at 851 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
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Cases involving the privacy rights of adults always stand for more
than the particular holding involved, even as the holding itself is vitally
important. But the opposite proves true in the field of children's rights.
Danforth turns out not to be any kind of statement about privacy. It is,
instead, a holding about a minor's right to terminate an abortion. 33' A
minor's right to terminate an abortion is not a subcategory of the greater
right to privacy. It is an end in itself. Whereas adult women have a
constitutional right to privacy which encompasses the right to decide
whether to terminate a pregnancy, but not the constitutional right to an
abortion as such, if we were to take seriously the Court's declaration that
the adolescent abortion cases are about a pregnant minor's constitutional
rights, we would quickly reach the startling conclusion that pregnant
adolescents-unlike all other persons-have a constitutional right to an
abortion, but not to privacy or autonomy.
Under American law, children are not autonomous agents
empowered to make significant decisions in their lives. Instead, they
"are always in someone's custody. 336 They are obliged to attend the
church their parents elect for them (or not attend any house of worship,
if that is their parent's preference). 37 They are obliged to attend the
school their parents select. 338 They even are obliged to withdraw from
school and return to the parent's farm to complete their religious and
communal study if that is their parents' choice and if the state otherwise
permits the parents to exercise that choice.339
This was not merely the law before the adolescent pregnant minor
cases reached the Supreme Court; it remains the law today. 4 ° If pregnant
minors had a constitutionally recognized right to privacy, of which the
right to terminate an abortion were merely an example, the entire law of
children's rights-both for boys and girls-would be radically different
335. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
336. Although a version of this phrase was first used in a Supreme Court decision in Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982), as the basis for deciding that
children in foster care are not in the kind of "custody" that fits the meaning of the federal habeas
corpus statute, see id. at 510-11, and relied upon two years later in Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253
(1984), as the rationale for concluding that a child's liberty interest in avoiding pretrial jail is less
than an adult's, see id. at 265, the true origins of the concept derives from the Bellotti plurality
opinion.
337. Children may be prohibited by state law from exercising tasks that adults certainly have a
constitutional right to exercise, even if the child believes it is her duty to undertake the task at the
risk of '"everlasting destruction at Armageddon."' Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 163
(1944).
338. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 401 (1923).
339. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972).
340. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).
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from the one we have today. I dare say it would be unrecognizable.
What might we expect to find if the abortion cases truly created
constitutional rights for adolescents? For one thing, we would expect
boys also to enjoy constitutional rights to privacy. But the abortion line
of cases has proven to be unavailing in enlarging any rights of
adolescent boys. (This is really a right for pregnant minors only.) In
addition, these cases do not apply even to adolescent girls outside of the
abortion context itself. (It is not really a constitutional right to privacy.)
In this instance, at least, the sum is dramatically smaller than the parts.
V.

WHAT'S REALLY GOING ON?

When a Supreme Court opinion, particularly one written by a
Justice as able as Justice Powell, is so devoid of analysis, we can
reasonably conclude it is a subterfuge for something else. That is
precisely what the Bellotti plurality opinion is. The abortion cases are
simply a use of state power to reorder society, shifting power over
children from parents to judges when it serves an instrumental value
wholly apart from a child's rights." Justice Powell's Bellotti opinion
ensured that pregnant minors were returned to the fold of an adult's firm
custody. 2 For those minors who, for whatever reason, choose not to
seek parental consent, a new adult was vested with the power over
them.343 This new adult is the judge.
It is most telling that Bellotti was decided in the same Term as
Parham v. J.R.35 In Parham, children challenged, on procedural due
process grounds, the constitutionality of a statute that allowed a parent to
commit his or her child to a psychiatric institution for "observation and
346
diagnosis" over the child's objection. The statute also authorized a
child's indefinite commitment when the attending physician certified
that the child requires hospitalization. ' 7 As applied to adults, the statute
would certainly be unconstitutional. 4 Unless an adult consented to such
commitment, a patient may not be kept in a psychiatric hospital over
341. It is difficult to overstate the incongruity of a rule that was created in the name of
advancing a minor's right to privacy which forces minors to file a lawsuit and appear before a judge
to plead for the privilege to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.
342. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 649 (1979) (plurality opinion).
343. See id. at 643 (plurality opinion).
344. See id. at 643-44 (plurality opinion).
345. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
346. See id. at 587,591.
347. See id. at 590-9 1.
348. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 576 (1975).
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objection except by court order. 49 In Parham, however, the child was
considered a "voluntary patient" because the child's commitment was
based on the parent's consent." ° Placing one's child in a psychiatric
hospital over the child's objection is an extraordinary exercise of
parental power, effecting a "massive curtailment of liberty." 35' Moreover,
the exercise of this power directly implicated a constitutional right of
children which the Supreme Court already had held children possessthe right to avoid loss of physical liberty.352
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld parental power in Parham,
reasoning that because parents usually make good child rearing choices,
their right to raise their children should not be interfered with lightly. 53
The Court also reasoned that because the parental decision was subject
to review by the attending physician, doctors were able to protect
children from wrongful institutionalization.' 4
The contrast between Bellotti and Parham could hardly be greater.
Parham empowered parents to place their children in institutions
without requiring judicial review in the face of evidence that "more than
half of the State's institutionalized children were not in need of
confinement if other forms of care were made available or used."355
Bellotti disempowered parents from providing consent to permit their
child to terminate her pregnancy in the absence of any evidence that
parents had misused their power.356 Parham chose to rely on doctors,
even though they "often lead to erroneous commitments since
psychiatrists tend to err on the side of medical caution and therefore
hospitalize patients for whom other dispositions would be more
beneficial. 357 Bellotti rejected reliance on doctors as a check on the
appropriateness of the desired procedure. 58 Parham rejected the
children's claim to a right to judicial review despite clear precedence
that children, like adults, have a constitutional liberty interest against
institutionalization. 3 9 Bellotti claimed to rely on a minor's constitutional
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See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
See Parham,442 U.S. at 589.
Id. at 622 (Stewart, J.,concurring) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509
See Inre Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
See Parham,442 U.S. at 603-04.
See id. at 604-05.
Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650-51 (1979) (plurality opinion).
Parham,442 U.S. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 641 n.21 (plurality opinion).
See Parham,442 U.S. at 613.
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right to privacy,3'6 though the Court had never before found they had
such a right and has never since relied on the alleged right as precedent
for any additional constitutional rights. Finally, in Parham, decided
twelve days before Bellotti, the Court piously declared that "[t]he statist
notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in
all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant
to American tradition. ' 6 ' In Bellotti, the Court refused to apply any
presumption that a parent acts in her child's best interests when making
important child rearing decisions. 62
Surely, none of this makes sense if viewed simply through the lens
of the constitutional rights of children. But these cases, and the broader
category of children's constitutional rights, become coherent when
considered in terms of public health and sound social policy. Simply
stated, the Bellotti rule only makes sense in public policy terms.
The rule that pregnant children need not seek their parents'
permission to obtain an abortion is based on the concern that many
children will not want to tell their parents and therefore will not do so,
whatever the law requires. This, in turn, will lead to unacceptable
results: either children will not tell their parents and not be able to
terminate their pregnancies until it is too late to do so;363 or they will not

360. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 655-56 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
361. Parham,442 U.S. at 603.
362. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642-43 (plurality opinion).
363. The Court clearly recognizes the public health policy issues involving adolescent
pregnancies. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1981) (plurality opinion):
At the risk of stating the obvious, teenage pregnancies, which have increased
dramatically over the last two decades, have significant social, medical, and economic
consequences for both the mother and her child, and the State.... [o]f those children
who are born, their illegitimacy makes them likely candidates to become wards of the
State.
Id. (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted).
In Michael M., a plurality of the Court specifically noted that "[tihe risk of maternal death
is 60% higher for a teenager under the age of 15 than for a women [sic] in her early twenties. The
risk is 13% higher for 15-to-19-year-olds. The statistics further show that most teenage mothers
drop out of school and face a bleak economic future." Id. at 471 n.4; see also Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977):
"[Tleenage motherhood involves a host of problems, including adverse physical and
psychological effects upon the minor and her baby, the continuous stigma associated
with unwed motherhood, the need to drop out of school with the accompanying
impairment of educational opportunities, and other dislocations [including] forced
marriage of immature couples and the often acute anxieties involved in deciding whether
to secure an abortion."
Id. at 696 n.21 (second alteration in original) (quoting Note, ParentalConsent Requirements and
Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1010 (1975)
(footnotes omitted)).
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tell their parents but will obtain an illegal abortion, thereby jeopardizing
their health. 64
Politics has placed the Court at the center of the adolescent
pregnant minor conundrum.3 65 Because of the polarization in the political
process over the extremely contentious issue of abortion, that process
has failed to yield a satisfactory answer in public health terms. In other
areas than abortion-treatment for sexually transmitted diseases or drug
or alcohol addiction, for example-the American political process has
achieved sensible public health rules as they affect minors without resort
to the Constitution or the Supreme Court. For more than thirty years,
legislatures have seen the wisdom of enacting laws in every state which
permit children ready access to treatment without any requirement of
parental consent or even notice. 66
The reason states have been able to develop coherent and sound
public health rules in these areas is because there is no counter-lobby to
maximizing the treatment of addicted minors or minors infected with
sexually transmitted diseases. In these areas, legislatures are aware that
treating minors is the only appropriate result. As Franklin Zimring has
pointed out: "legislation dealing with venereal disease and drug and
alcohol abuse is really state guidance of adolescents rather than any
recognition of autonomy. In public policy terms, there is only one right
answer to the question of whether alcoholism, drug misuse, or venereal
disease should be treated rather than ignored."3 67
These issues have avoided the political focus that abortion has had,
and these laws were passed, even though many of the arguments in favor
of parental notice requirements for abortion are equally as powerful
when applied to children who require treatment for sexually transmitted
diseases.3' 6
364. See Jennifer C. Friedman, Parental Notice in State Abortion Statutes: Filling the Gap in
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 437, 463 (1998).
365. As Professor Dolgin has written:
[T]he Court's construction of the judicial bypass option, freeing girls from parental
authority, but imposing on them the heavy burden of petitioning and appearing before a
judicial tribunal, can be attributed to the politics of abortion-here to an interest in
balancing support for the right to abortion with circumscribed support for that right.
Dolgin, supra note 11, at 398-99 (footnote omitted).
366. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & ALAN SUSSMAN, THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE 207 &
app. D (1985).
367. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 64 (1982).
368. There is an important distinction between consent and notice requirements here. Though
there is a real choice to be made concerning whether to terminate a pregnancy or carry the fetus to
term, there is no real choice whether to treat a child who has contracted a sexually transmitted
disease. For this reason, the arguments in favor of parental consent requirements for abortion may
be more powerful than for the treatment of sexually transmitted diseases. This is especially true
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For better or worse, it simply is not currently possible in the United
States to rely on the political process to satisfactorily resolve the deeply
contentious abortion issue. Because of intensive lobbying by antiabortion groups, many state legislatures have spent much of the past
thirty years enacting laws specifically designed to make it difficult for
women of any age to obtain an abortion. As a result, the political process
has come to rely on the Supreme Court to bail out the legislatures when
they have not gotten right the public health choices of Americans.369 The
same legislatures that have succumbed to the pressure to create barriers
to adult women having abortions have done so for minors as well.
The abortion cases can only be properly understood as a public
health challenge which the Court has accepted. Through them, the Court
has been willing to write the rules under which pregnant minors may
terminate their pregnancies. Opponents of abortion have succeeded in
many state legislatures in enacting laws restricting a woman's right to
terminate a pregnancy which the Supreme Court may not overturn
except by invoking the Constitution.3 7 The choices facing the Court
when hearing challenges to statutes interfering with a minor's
opportunity to terminate a pregnancy are few and unappealing. On the
one hand, the choice to uphold laws that require parental consent before
a nonemergency abortion may be performed on an unemancipated
minor-though quite coherent in terms of the Constitution-is
unacceptable on public health grounds.37' On the other hand, by relying
on the Constitution as the basis for striking statutes that require parental
37
consent, the Court created incoherent doctrine in constitutional terms,
however sensible its rules are in public health terms.
when the treatment for sexually transmitted diseases is relatively safe and there are not many
treatments to choose from. Professor Zimring is right not only that parents really have no choice
about whether to consent to their child being treated for a sexually transmitted disease, they have
very little choice even about what type of treatment to provide. See id. at 64-65. But, whatever
arguments support parental notice requirements in the abortion context certainly have equal force
when it comes to treatment for sexually transmitted diseases or addiction.
369. Legislators who do not really believe in creating roadblocks for pregnant women are
nonetheless able to do so in the knowledge that the Supreme Court will strike down the more
Draconian blocks (since the substantive standard for evaluating the legality of any block is whether
it imposes an "undue burden" on the pregnant woman's right to obtain an abortion). See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy &
Souter, JJ.).
370. See Scott, supra note 11, at 569 n.86.
371. See id. at 575-76: "It may be that, under these circumstances, the Court deems the creation
of an intermediate category to be the only viable solution. Perhaps the endorsement of the by-pass
hearing reflects a view that the classification decision can be better resolved by courts than in the
politically-charged legislative arena." Id. at 576.
372. Professor Dolgin has called this field "bafflingly contradictory." Dolgin, supra note 11,
at 412.
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In Parham v. J.R., the Court could comfortably rely on physicians
to review parental choice because the Court understood that if physicians
erred, it would be on the side of admitting children into mental
hospitals. 3 3 The political consequences of that error-proneness on the
medical profession's part were quite tolerable. But in Bellotti, it was not
politically acceptable to trust doctors because the doctors who perform
abortions in the United States are already a self-selected group of
physicians who believe in choice.37 4 Here the concern is that the doctors
would "rubber stamp" the minor's decision to have an abortion.3 15 This
concern is made explicitly by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion
in Danforth which was joined by Justice Powell.376 Though "rubber
stamping" by judges is politically acceptable, rubber stamping by
physicians was not. Such a result would have seemed to the American
public to be tantamount to ceding the authority to the minor to decide for
herself whether to terminate an abortion. There is a deep relationship
between why this perceived result is so antithetical to many Americans
and why adolescents do not really have a constitutional right to an
abortion today. 77
What is ultimately most problematic about the current parental
involvement statutes is that they are a dishonest approach to this
problem. One could certainly argue that if all bypass hearings end with
rubber stamp consent, advocating too loudly to change this system could
only result in a worse system for minors.37 s On the other hand, one is
373. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 612-13 (1979).
374. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 641 (1979) (plurality opinion).
375. See id. at 642 (plurality opinion).
376. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 n.2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
377. Professor Dolgin goes even further and shows how outrageous it is for the Court to turn a
blind eye to unequivocal evidence of harm inflicted on minors as a result of the judicial bypass
requirement. See Dolgin, supra note 11, at 413. Her explanation, like mine, is that a majority of the
Court will not tolerate a result that frees pregnant minors from the shackles of childhood. See id. at
417. Professor Dolgin's accounting for this is that the Court is unwilling to "threaten sacred images
of childhood through which society struggles to satisfy its deep nostalgia for tradition." Id. at 416.
378. There is considerable evidence that virtually all pregnant minors who seek resort to the
judicial process are able to obtain an abortion. See Scott, supra note 11, at 574 (citing MNOOKIN,
supra note 304, at 239-40).
Between 1981 and 1983, ninety percent of the 1300 petitioning minors in Massachusetts
courts were deemed "mature." In the rest (with one exception), abortion without parental
consent was determined to be in the minors' best interest. That sole exception went to a
neighboring state. "Every pregnant minor who has sought judicial authorization for an
abortion has secured an abortion."
Id. at 574 n. 111 (citations omitted) (quoting MNOOKIN, supra note 304, at 239). Similarly, evidence
presented in federal litigation in the late 1980s showed that fifteen out of 3573 applications for
abortions by minors in Minnesota were denied. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 441
(1990).
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chilled to read reports of judges who harassed pregnant minors in their
courtrooms, forced them to go to anti-abortion clinics prior to granting a
hearing, and assigned anti-abortion lawyers to represent them in court.379
One writer reports of an Alabama judge who appointed a guardian ad
litem to a fetus in order to "assure that the fetus had 'an opportunity to
have a voice, even a vicarious one, in the decision making.' 380 In
addition, there are real costs imposed on pregnant minors who appear
before judges. It can be extremely traumatic to minors. "'You see all the
typical things that you would see with somebody under incredible
amounts of stress, answering monosyllabically, tone of voice, tenor of
voice, shaky, wringing of hands ... one young lady had her-her hands
were turning blue and it was warm in my office.""'38 But the current
system is a masked one in which a majority of the Court very likely
prefer that pregnant minors who would want to terminate their
pregnancies do so.382 They are barred from saying this out loud (and may
not even admit it to themselves). But their actions speak louder than
anything.
The trap in which the Justices find themselves is easily stated. They
are unable to announce a rule that minors have the identical right as
adults to terminate a pregnancy. An adult woman's right to have an
abortion stems from her Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights. 3 But
the Court will not tolerate the conclusion that young women have
significant privacy rights. At the same time, the Court is unable to strike
a statute limiting a pregnant minor's opportunity to secure an abortion
without talking in terms of the Constitution and constitutional rights
of minors.

379. See Amy Bach, No Choicefor Teens, NATION, Oct. 11, 1999, at 6, 6-7.
380. Id. at 7 (quoting Montgomery, Ala. Juvenile Judge Mark Anderson).
381. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 766 (D. Minn. 1986) (quoting testimony of
Judge William Sweeney).
382. I recognize this explanation is the opposite of the one commonly given. Many
commentators suggest that the Court is antagonistic to minors obtaining abortions. Certainly this is
true for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. But I do not believe it is true for
anyone else on the Court. Nor do I believe there were ever five members of the Court who were
opposed to pregnant minors obtaining abortions when they want them. In particular, I believe the
votes of Justices Stewart and Powell, which were needed in Danforth to obtain a majority to strike
the Missouri law, merely reflected these Justices' common sense understanding that requiring
parental consent as a precondition to a child obtaining an abortion will result in too many teenagers
becoming parents before they are prepared and before they want to do so. I believe that Justices
Stewart and Powell's common sense views continue in Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Because of
their votes, combined with the votes of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, there
remains sufficient votes to keep the legacy of Danforth alive.
383. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60 (1976).
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Part of what is so remarkable about all of this is how successful the
Court has been in promoting the notion that the abortion cases are about
a child's rights. Just as amazingly, Justice Powell was able to place in
the state's hands the power to veto a minor's choice to terminate a
pregnancy as the means of vindicating the minor's rights.3 4 Having first
divested parents of a right they enjoyed through a line of Supreme Court
cases stretching over fifty years, the Court endowed the state with it.385
VI.

CONCLUSION

The adolescent abortion cases are deeply incoherent in terms of
parental rights, abortion rights generally (which are about privacy, not
abortion in itself), and abortion rights specifically (because the bypass
procedures should surely be recognized as creating "undue burdens" on
the constitutional right to privacy).
The public health consequences of not liberating children from
parental consent requirements would be an increase in unwanted teenage
mothers (unwanted both by the mothers themselves and by society
because of the manifold associated costs). But, the dilemma for the
Court was that it was unable-with any degree of consistency with
broader principles of constitutional law-to liberate minors and give
them the privacy right to choose abortion. Not only would such a result
be inconsistent with precedent, it would also belie the real difference
between adults and children which the Justices (and the law itself)
regard as fundamental. Hence, the unfortunate compromise of a bypass
with no standards.
The upshot of this dramatic shift was that parents were the ultimate
losers in the minor abortion cases. Children (in the first instance,
pregnant girls) ended up in a different place than they began before
Danforth, not precisely either winners or losers, but hardly in the heady
world of constitutional rights. The state was the definitive winner in that
it gained control over the lives of adolescents. The Supreme Court has
systematically given judges the power to exercise moral convictions
about abortion, even to the point of imposing those views onto pregnant
minors. To do so in the name of "advancing the constitutional rights of
children" is nothing less than perverse. The yawning chasm between
rhetoric and reality betrays the glaring flaw at the core of the modem
jurisprudence of children's rights.

384. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 648 (1979) (plurality opinion).
385. See id. at 635 (plurality opinion).
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